

NEW TIMES


January 1992

The British
who fled
from Hitler
fell in
Stalin's
hands

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
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
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
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From our mailbag

■ Attack on the press accusing it of biased reporting and other sins have always angered me. I have always believed that *New Times* gives only truthful information. While reading issue number 43 of last year I felt sympathy for your correspondent Nikolai Kalinkin, who nearly died obtaining information about the events in Karabakh. But when I saw the photograph of "an armoured carrier" left over by Azerbaijanians, who in such a way "arm" Armenians, I understood how the media stirs up ethnic conflicts.

The photograph shows not an armoured carrier but an ordinary truck tractor. Tractors of this kind are supplied to all oil workers and geologists in the North. They have no armaments or armour. I shall not be surprised in the future if I see a bicycle with "ground-to-ground" missiles or a disabled person's wheelchair with a gun attached. Mistakes of this kind seem to be a trifle to your magazine.

Y. Nizhnev
Serpukhov

■ The author of the article *Com-mandante and others* (No 44/91) contends that "even guajiro - a

peasant who has traditionally fed the country - does not eat his fill" in Cuba today.

In general, few people eat their fill today, the more so as the satiation of one's wants is a loose concept. Cuba has never been a traditionally peasant country. In the period of Spanish colonial rule the land was owned by planters and slaves worked on their plantations. In the period of new-colonialism, US monopolies organized latifundia in which the same slaves worked. After the Spanish colonialists had been driven out the peasants did not receive land, because it was advantageous for US business to turn them into proletarians. In the 1920s, with the help of armed gendarmes, the Yankees evicted peasants from their plots.

It was only after the victory of the revolution that the peasants received the right to land. In 1987, after the study of the document on the abolition of rural poverty in Cuba, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America recommended the Cuban experience to other Latin American countries, including Chile whose successes are praised so much today.

Before the revolution only eight percent of the Cubans had access to medical care, and there was only one hospital in the countryside.

Zoya Sokolova
Moscow

■ I have been on a pension for almost ten years now. I had difficult and dirty work in a stuffy dark shop. We were forced to work ten hours a day, almost without days off, in order to fulfil the plan. I earned 120 to 150 rubles a month, which was not so bad at that time. Whatever money was left I deposited in a saving-bank for a rainy day. I thought that in my old age I would not live in poverty. But my hopes were destroyed. As a result of a reform carried out by Pavlov (former premier) my deposit was virtually depreciated. It turns out that I worked hard in vain. Such is also the fate of all veteran workers. The money honestly earned by us during all our life has been taken away from us.

Why such injustice?

Nina Ladynina
Krasnodar

It's not simple to find the right answer

■ In spite of numerous official statements our defence policy has not been reorganized in a rational way. Incidentally, rationality is a much a clearer criterion than the concept of defence sufficiency. The transition to defence sufficiency implies that we made a mistake in the past by creating a "surplus" of defence potential. There is a grain of truth in this statement. However, it is not the whole truth. The truth is that many steps taken by our country in the defence field in the past have no rational justification (including the strengthening of military might). The most evident example is the building of an anti-missile defence system around Moscow. Mistakes of this kind can best be characterized as the "irrationality of defence policy."

What kind of rationality can one talk about if till now we annually put in orbit about 70 space vehicles, mostly for military purposes. What we really need is about a dozen vehicles a year. We have not yet dismantled Moscow's anti-missile defence system, which is absolutely senseless from the military point of view and highly onerous economically. According to US information, we are simultaneously modernizing a good

dozen carriers of strategic nuclear weapons. The story of the Energia and Buran carriers can be recalled in connection with this.

As in other branches, different kinds of people are employed in the defence industry. My colleagues joke that ten million rubles must be spent from the defence budget in order to receive 416 rubles on top of their wage (the size of an average bonus for them). Unfortunately, for some people it is not a joke but a guiding principle. Other people think in a different way. Many of those employed in the defence industry feel ashamed that hundreds of billions of rubles are spent irrationally while the country has been brought to ruin.

It is up to military historians to examine why so much money has been squandered. I suspect it will not be simple to give the right answer. This can be explained (new history is made only once) by the egoism of departments, and many other factors.

How could we know that the USSR had produced 27 carriers of strategic nuclear weapons? We learned this from American sources.

It is necessary to control military spending at hun-

A truck tractor is not an armoured carrier

Is the immoral reasonable?

The slogan of Zionism

■ In issue 38 you carried the advertisement of your magazine with sexual drawings. Don't you think that it is morally indecent? From time immemorial intimate relations between man and woman have been veiled. What you have done is immoral. And is it reasonable? It seems you regard us, readers, as consumers who can swallow anything.

I hate immorality and shall not subscribe to *New Times* which I have read for many years. I used to believe that your weekly had more noble goals.

A.Koplev
Moscow

■ I agree with the basic provisions of Dmitry Zgersky's *Legends of Zionism* (No 40/91).

The goal of Zionism is to bring Jews back to their homeland, put an end their condi-


tion of their eternal exile. It is a simple and clear aim. However, even the most noble goal can be discredited by the tested method of using slogans, such as "Zionism is an extremely reactionary ideology, frantic chauvinism and racism." This nonsense is eaten up by our home fascists.

When the Jewish state was re-established the majority of Moslem countries and the entire Arab world did not recognize its right to existence. Democratic Israel was like a "white crow" among the 23 Arab countries with monarchies, dictatorship and totalitarian regimes. Having failed in the armed struggle against Israel, the Arab countries began publicly to denounce Zionism as an ideology and thus denigrate this state while giving anti-Semites the ground for new accusations.

This happened not in the Goebbels-led department but in the United Nations, the most respected international organization. On November 1975 the 30th UN General Assembly adopted by 72 votes a resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism. The Soviet Union with its three votes played a considerable role in these efforts.

Why did it happen? After the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 the Arabs used their main weapon

THE WAY I SEE IT



Drawing by Victor Bogorad

— oil blackmail. The United Nations had 144 members in January 1976. Who voted for the resolution? These countries can be divided into three groups. The first group consisted of 23 Arab and 15 Mos-

lem or half-Moslem states of Asia and Africa. In many African countries, in addition to native beliefs, Islam is the religion of large groups of the population who influence government policy. In 1973 six African countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel under the pressure from the Organization of African Unity, and Arab states.

The second group consisted of more than 20 countries who belonged to the socialist camp, and the third group included countries fully dependent on Arab oil.

In December 1989 US Vice-President Dan Quayle urged the Soviet government to raise at the General Assembly the question of repealing the shameful anti-Zionist resolution. Moscow gave a vague reply. It was only after the August coup attempt that the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations with Israel. The anti-Zionist resolution was also annulled. It took much time to realize evident things.

A.Knopov
Kharkov

Compiled by Tatiana Chernova

dreds of points and carry out hundreds of investigations of the work and expenditure in each particular field. The parliament must have an effective mechanism of control in this respect. This machinery is being set up very slowly, and it can hardly be created in the atmosphere of unrestrained emotions or disdain for dry "arithmetic" arguments.

Should the nuclear weapon testing be resumed now? If we do not resume tests the designers of weapons run the risk of losing their expertise and the nuclear arsenals may become less reliable. If we begin tests we shall open the way to an arms race. The new carriers will be fitted with new warheads. The United States will react to the threat, and so on.

There is a typical situation of timing. The parliament wasted its time and energies on squabbles. At the same time, members of its commission for defence and security have never visited Arzamas-16. It's a pity, because they could have learned a lot about problems of defence and conversion in one closed town taken as a case in point. The institutes of the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering have lost their previous stature. It's true that 70 percent

of their capacities should be converted to civil needs. The institutes should be partly privatized and alternative production of socially useful articles should be organized in closed towns. In Arzamas-16 this question was raised 20 years ago, but no progress has been made since then. At the same time, it is not possible simply to open the stop valve and leave these institutes in a state of degradation.

Nuclear tests cannot be resumed now, for the ensuing dangers would be too serious. It is possible that they should be resumed at a low level (four to six tests a year) when our defence policy will finally become rational. The purpose of these four to six tests should be to lay the ground for a complete prohibition of all nuclear tests in the world for all times. Incidentally, an immediate bilateral agreement on the prohibition of tests would also be a good way out.

Yevgeny Domilovsky,
candidate of physics
and mathematics

Arzamas

Share-out hour

The Russia-Ukraine squabble over the Black Sea Fleet has captured the public eye, ousting other political events from the media. Who will get the Black Sea Fleet? This is the talk of the town, not only in the corridors of power



Photo by Vladimir Svartsevich

It would seem that our politicians have lost all commonsense, except as concerns one major intellectual problem, their agreement on the inviolability of frontiers. In short, we have avoided territorial division, aware that this would be pure dynamite. Yet surely the sharing out of the armed forces is as explosive. Nevertheless, republican leaders are tackling this issue head on.

Why the haste? Why does the Ukraine want all troops deployed in its territory to urgently swear allegiance? Why does it seek to nationalize the Black Sea Fleet? Kiev contends that the armed presence of another unknown state within a sovereign state is out of question. This is debatable, as the CIS which incorporates the Ukraine, inherited the armed forces of the erstwhile USSR. Moreover, involved is not only weaponry, but also army personnel who find it difficult at any moment to take a new oath of allegiance, of course be this serious, not pure form.

So why is Kiev rushing things? Does it think itself threatened by armed forces subordinated to the Moscow-based Supreme Command? However the Union Centre is no more and the armed forces of the erstwhile USSR are neutral. Hence, in the obtaining situation, when only the democrat Yeltsin is the one leader left in the Kremlin, there should really be no need to whip up tensions within the CIS. Admittedly, it is often the case for the presence of a "strange" armed force to serve rather to stabilize, not aggravate, a state's domestic situation. Thus, if Georgia had had its own national army, scarcely could Gamsakhurdia have been deposed so rapidly and with such little bloodshed. A national army often worries politicians rather than instils confidence. I think the matter is merely one of prestige, of having an army and a navy, hoisting the Ukraine's yellow-blue flag.

What is bad about any share-out is that regardless of cultural levels, breeding, and good

intentions, it often fosters the oldest of human instincts, one of the worst of which is to grab anything while the going is good. Consequently attempts to nationalize the Fleet in the Ukraine have already provoked bad feelings amongst Russians, such as suspicion, egoism, jealousy, and dislike of what that country's leaders and parliamentarians are doing. I think that many Ukrainians feel the same, inducing them to recall the chauvinistic empire-building dreams of the Muscovites. At any rate, such feelings by no means serve to improve relations between Russia and the Ukraine. On the contrary, they only serve to fortify Russian nationalism, which thus far had maintained a rather low profile. However, now all in Russia put a premium on the interests not of the Commonwealth, nor of the Ukraine, but of Russia. The Black Sea Fleet exercise has ideally contributed to such sentiments.

It has got to be noted that neither Russia nor the Ukraine had much time or desire to look out for their own national interests. Indeed, had they put their minds to it, they could have evolved a totally different solution. Instead of sticking it out they could have demonstrated greater foresight and flexibility. After all, why should Russia bother to hold on to this Fleet, two thirds of which are actually obsolete? Indeed, it has only a bit of a Black Sea shoreline. Hence are the ships of the Black Sea Fleet worth the hysteria? Couldn't Russia have regarded this Fleet as a bargaining chip in a major political game and secure something else in exchange? However, the squabble is now one of principle, of honour. Will politicians have enough common sense to give the Fleet a go by, the more so as neither the Ukraine nor Russia, nor the Commonwealth for that matter are menaced from the sea? Will they settle the problem rationally, that is through negotiation? Yet now politicians are egged on not only by personal ambition, but also by a groundswell of public opinion urging them not to give up "what's ours!" One fears this might shake the very foundation of the relationship between the Ukraine and Russia as concerns recognition of the boundaries between them, inasmuch as the Fleet issue is so closely bound up with that other problem of the Crimea. In short, a wholesale share-out of the armed forces is truly too dangerous, as it can only promote strife and cause confrontation.

Marina Shakina

The Crimea's off-shore reefs

Will the Black Sea Fleet come under the hammer?

Vladimir Zhitomirsky,
our special correspondent

Walking down Lenin Street, one of Sevastopol's central thoroughfares, I met an elderly gentleman carrying two empty pails coming my way. That is supposed to be a bad omen here in Russia. But of omens later. Such people carrying pails and jerrycans were making for a tanker inscribed "Potable Water." It appears that in this Hero City tap water is totally non-drinkable now. However, residents are thankful that the drinking water, which is brought up from artesian wells, is free of charge. Otherwise, there would have been another headache, whether to pay for it in rubles or in the newly introduced coupons.

On January 10, which was a Friday, local residents were told that they could get food only in exchange for coupons. True, these coupons had been issued to the population the previous evening, but not to everyone. Even so three quarters of wages and salaries were nevertheless in rubles. The locals do not know what they are to do with their rubles. Are they to travel specially to Russia to use them there? Yet relations with Russia are rapidly going downhill, now over the war-famed Black Sea Fleet.

I'm in command

At a very recent get-together in Kiev with Leonid Kravchuk, Admiral Igor Kasatonov, the Fleet Commander, explained, the Ukrainian President said his republic was forming its own armed force, of which he was to be Supreme Commander, and that all troops deployed within the republic, including the men of the Black Sea Fleet, were to come under its jurisdiction. The Admiral's arguments got nowhere. Yet when he had met Kravchuk in October, the latter had told him that he had had no intention of interfering in the Fleet's affairs.

What occurred between these two meetings was an event of no mean significance, notably the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The relative document that the eleven republican leaders

signed stipulated that strategic forces would not be subordinated to any Commonwealth member. These strategic forces incorporated all strategic rocket forces, the Air Force, the Fleet, and the like. Four of our Fleets obviously discharge strategic tasks. However, the Ukrainian President contends that the accords indicated in their footnotes that the said list was to be stipulated for each CIS member by a separate protocol. He also claimed that the Fleet was composed of a strategic arm and a non-strategic service with only the strategic arm armed with missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

The Admiral wryly observed that the Ukraine's leadership had but one naval expert, who after skipping a mine-sweeper had been chief of a depot. Indeed, the Admiral noted, had the Ukrainian leader have under him General Staff or Naval Academy graduates they would cleared matters. After all, the Fleet is a well integrated machine, comprised of huge aircraft carriers, support ships, subchasers, mine-sweepers, a naval air arm, a coast guard and the like. Navy chiefs and the Black Sea Fleet command had advised Kiev as regards the formation of a Ukrainian Navy, proposing 39 units and ships and the relevant infrastructure in the Western section of the Black Sea. Kiev declined, preferring to collar the entire Fleet. Why? There are, at least, three reasons.

The first is embodied in Kiev's official reply that under the CIS accords that is its due. May we note that the Ukrainian government's interpretation of these accords is, mildly speaking, open to question.

The second reason derives from considerations of prestige. It is claimed that this new state with its population of 50 million needs naval forces that would be as big as its army, which latter is to be almost twice that of the UK and way in excess of that of Germany, although in population the UK is level with the Ukraine, while Germany has half as much again.

Finally, the third reason stems from purely pragmatic considerations of an economic order. The ships, along with all their paraphernalia, are worth much, which is not to be sneezed at in these current hungry times. Thus, Admiral Kasatonov be-

believes that many of the ships will come under the hammer.


Yet it must be realized that a serious stake is involved. What I mean is the balance of forces. True, common sense suggests that it would be a good thing were the military equilibrium to demonstrate a low profile. Of course, both "we," implying the "East," which has contracted by now to the CIS, and "they," implying the "West" which is so sure of its military potential that it has voluntarily agreed to reduce military spending and its armed force, should seek such an equilibrium. Fortunately, the concept of partnership between the two sides is slowly, but, hopefully, surely ousting the traditional concept of confrontation. Yet in the view of naval experts, the absence of a naval balance of forces could have the most unpredictable of consequences. Indeed, the "warm seas" area is still much of a hazard, as smouldering there to this day are the embers of Saddam Hussein's recent conflagration.

Whom to serve?

Generally speaking, the notion that some of the new states arising out of the erstwhile Union republics, desire to "privatize" the armed forces, deployed within their territories is illogical. After all, when stationing the armed forces throughout the USSR's territory in its time, the Defence Ministry and General Staff were guided by considerations of their own, as a result of which a larger or smaller force may have come to be deployed within one or another republic. So would it not be nonsensical for one or another of these new states to have a much larger military potential, exclusively due to previous Defence Ministry and General Staff decisions?

Then remember that the armed forces were subsidized by all tax-paying citizens of the former Soviet Union. Should this not be taken into consideration in the share-out?

But back to the Black Sea Fleet. The squabbling is most intensive over the oath of allegiance. At stormy gatherings and rallies in Sebastopol, the Fleet's central base, the only demand made is that no oath of allegiance to the Ukraine be sworn. However, Kiev is bringing great pressure to bear with both stick and carrot. Service personnel are told that if they do not want to serve the Ukraine, they should either get out or go back to civvy



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

street, which for all who have made service in the Navy their career is a most dramatic choice, as I realized in conversations with many servicemen. Thus, one Lieutenant exclaimed: "What, am I to go packing heaven knows where with my family? And why should I swear the oath of allegiance to the Ukraine's yellow-blue flag?"

Aboard the *Sderzhanny*, a huge subchaser, crammed with sundry rockets, torpedoes and depth charges, I had a heart-to-heart chat with the ship's chief personnel officer, Lt. Commodore Sergei Khudik. "Being more or less conversant with legal issues," he said, "I must know when taking the oath of allegiance, what I am letting myself in for, what the conditions are, and whom I'm going to serve. In the meantime we have no laws as regards the armed forces, nor any social security for servicemen. That is absent in the Commonwealth generally, let alone in the Ukraine and in Russia. Hence, before taking any oath of allegiance I would like to have everything downput, in black and white. On the other hand, I think that whatever oath of allegiance we might swear, we owe our loyalty to the people generally. Recalling the oath I took 18 years or so ago, it spoke, as far as I remember, of loyalty to the people. Aboard our ship we have men of 23 different nationalities. How am I to get them take the oath of allegiance to one or another sovereign state? We simply wouldn't have a full complement for the ship. Let me

merely say, that what has to be done is to have a political solution evolved and the appropriate laws enacted as concerns the Navy."

At their meeting aboard this ship, the officers decided like one man that they would not swear the oath of allegiance to the Ukraine. Neither stick nor carrot helped, even though living standards are in a pretty bad way, with only three of the 35 officers living in their own flats. The others have to rent lodgings privately at a monthly 400 rubles, which is more than a third of the pay a lieutenant commodore draws.

Commodore Mikhail Timofeyev, whose prospective crew are thus far serving aboard other ships, as his newly-built ship is still not on hand, observed that every sovereign state in the Commonwealth even Tatarstan was entitled to have its own Navy. How then are we to divvy up, he asked, the Black Sea Fleet. Should we, he continued, give half a ship to Tatarstan and another half to Chuvashia? Or two ships to Russia and one to the Ukraine?

All these points were unambiguously raised in the resolutions of Black Sea Fleet officers adopted at their meetings. "Though we respect the Ukraine's sovereignty and its right to have its own armed forces," these resolutions stated, "we categorically demand that all these matters be settled in a civilized way stage by stage, so that the necessary legislation be enacted with respect to servicemen and so that the morale, the principles and confidence in the future

not be undermined. We believe it more reasonable to have one united Black Sea Fleet that would discharge its tasks in the interests of the Ukraine, of Russia and of all the other Commonwealth states."

But back to the oath of allegiance. Like many other things in the Commonwealth the matter is hazy, to say the least. Kiev alleges that virtually all the servicemen in the Fleet are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the Ukraine. I, on the other hand, had yet to meet a single serviceman who wanted to do that, although I chatted up many in Sebastopol, some even in an impromptu manner out in the street. What they did stress, though, was that the naval officers and seamen have their own code of honour, that they had taken the oath of allegiance to the people, that Sebastopol was a city of Russian glory, and that the Black Sea Fleet had been paid for by all the republics. Admiral Kasatonov told me that nobody had totted up the pros and cons as regards this new oath of allegiance.

It was also said that in this present day and age of privatization, it would be a good thing, when writing off obsolete ships, to use the money thereby obtained to build housing for servicemen, insofar as over the years they had dedicated all their energies to maintaining these vessels at due and proper combat level. Housing represents a great headache, as I saw for myself when visiting Commodore Timofeyev at his "home." All he had was one room for his family of four, with a cot and a locker for each in this former bachelors' hostel so long filled with the cires of children and "decorated" with laundry hung up to dry. There is but one kitchen with several gas rings and three tables for 26 and one loo and shower for both sexes. A timetable has been worked out for the water supply, with several hours of cold water and several hours again for hot water. The bath tub is filled to the brim with water in event of the supply being switched off. As for potable water, they do not have any and drink tap water when available. Certainly a crying shame, not only for the Navy, but for all of us.

In true Bolshevik style?

Let me now tell you what this gigantic force known as the Black Sea Fleet consists of. It has 45 surface ships, 28 submarines, upwards of 300 smaller boats, 151 aircraft and 85 helicopters. This force, note, was built up when the military industrial complex held sway and squandered our money at its own discretion over the decades. Would independent experts tell us today, in the cold light of the morning, whether all this was essential to maintain the required balance of force? I am sure we could have easily saved a thousand million rubles on an aircraft carrier, whatever it may have been officially termed, and have used the money to guarantee decent living conditions for the servicemen and thus raise the morale.

While in Sebastopol, I could not help wondering for what earthly purpose Kiev needed to aggravate matters. Had it underestimated sentiments in the Navy? Or was it due to the euphoria felt over the recent successful pressure exerted against Russia. Or, finally, was this because Kiev thought "they'd have to give in anyhow." Incidentally, neither before, nor on the day that coupons were introduced in the Ukraine, including the Crimea, were servicemen issued with them. This, mind you, is in circumstances when shops no longer accept rubles and people have to fork up at least a tenner for a one-ruble coupon. However, this has only intensified the aggravation felt aboard the ships.

So why this tough attitude? Evidently, objectively the Ukrainian leader needs to constantly demonstrate that all he thinks about are the interests of the independent Ukraine, so that nobody associate his present well-thought-out moves to ensure interests and human rights with his long-standing Communist Party nomenklatura past.

There are two ways of dividing up the property of the erstwhile USSR. One is to apply the Bolshevik approach, that is to split everything up and accordingly lose everything. The other is to adopt a civilized solution and make joint use of this property.


After the proposal that Marshal Evgeny Shaposhnikov, the Supreme Commander of CIS armed forces advanced to adopt a two- or three-year period of transition with respect to the Black Sea Fleet and after Boris Yeltsin's unequivocal statement that the naval seamen were under his protection as Russia's President, and that hence they should not swear any oath of allegiance to the Ukraine, the Ukrainians and the Russians had another get-together to which the commanding officers of the Black Sea Fleet were invited. I don't think it is a very good idea for servicemen to publicly come out with political arguments in support of one or another side. Indeed, I think it would be much better for them and for society generally to dedicate themselves wholeheartedly to maintaining the proper combat level. True, this time both sides clearly strove to reach a compromise and reportedly this was attained. According to tentative estimates, about 30 percent of the ships are to be placed under the Ukraine's jurisdiction with the remainder, mostly of the strategic arm to be subordinated to Russia. However, it is still not clear how crews will be complemented, whether seamen will have a free choice as regards the oath of allegiance or how Kiev plans to use these naval vessels.

Before I emplaned for Moscow, I encountered on Sebastopol's Lenin Street a lady carrying two full pails of water. Was this a good omen?

SEVASTOPOL-MOSCOW

EXCLUSIVE FOR NEW TIMES

**Supreme Commander of
CIS Armed Forces,
Marshal
Evgeny Shaposhnikov:**



Much is being said nowadays that some CIS members supposedly plan to sell nuclear weapons or are already doing that. Again and again the mass media report that Transcaucasia supposedly has several thousand units of tactical nuclear weapons, which represents a hazard, as these weapons may be seized, proliferated or vended. That is all stuff and nonsense. I don't seek to hurt anyone's feelings, but I must say that for the mass media to say such things is dangerous, if not criminal. The CIS has reaffirmed its commitment to all the international agreements that the Soviet Union signed in its time, including the agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. All talk that while in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Vice-President Rutskoi discussed nuclear weapons sales is sheer invention.

As for selling conventional weapons, I think the sovereign states should reach an accord in that respect. One may conjecture why the sovereign states so greatly desire to take possession of these weapons, as in the USSR in time they were mostly concentrated on the periphery. It could well be that some sovereign states would like to sell these weapons, thereby to profit, though to say that is not very appropriate. Could it be that they want thus to cope with their social problems? Whatever the case, it seems to me that they should not go about this separately.

Though I have no intention of teaching anyone, the more so the leaders of the sovereign states what they ought to do, what they should focus on nowadays are economic issues. Indeed, if the dividing up of the armed forces would serve to cope with economic issues and raise popular standards of welfare, I would be amenable not only to dividing up the armed forces, but even having myself carved into eleven different pieces.

Back to Senate Square?

Oh Lord, we have heard it — a new oath of allegiance, unrest in the army, protests by officers and even by entire regiments. Indeed, there is nothing new in history — everything has already been. Last time it was in the Senate Square in December 1825. And now... I wouldn't like to use the popular saying of a certain now unpopular German philosopher to define this historical repetition as a farce.

Why did Leonid Kravchuk so hastily decide to have all troops stationed on the territory of the Ukraine swear allegiance to it? What made him do the same in regard to the fleet deployed in waters near the Ukrainian coast? Did he fear that without an oath the troops would not obey the president? Maybe a war was approaching and he would need troops? Well, the situation in the republic seemed stable. Or the Ukraine was going to start hostilities against one of the neighbouring republics — Russia, Moldova, or Poland? This hypothesis is still more absurd. Or, maybe, the Ukraine wants a "mono-ethnic" army? Hardly so.

Differences between military philosophies in the republics were discernible as early as before the meeting in Alma-Ata. Especially noticeable was the contradictory and inconsistent character of Ukrainian military policy. Declara-

tions replaced one another; it seemed, however, that there would gradually be worked out a position in harmony with the other former republics. It seemed that hasty measures would be avoided. Not so in Kiev.

I will not reproach Kiev alone for haste. I can well imagine that some former republics were unpleasantly surprised at the haste with which Russia ordered the hoisting of its flag over embassies of the former Soviet Union. The Commonwealth of Independent States had agreed to hand over the Soviet seat in the United Nations Security Council to Russia, but nothing had been said about the embassies. Kravchuk's dissatisfaction is easy to understand; so, a tooth for a tooth?

The issue of the oath reaches wildly far beyond the limits of purely military formalities. So many correct words were said about the necessity to separate the army and politics and about the undesirability of involving the army in politics. Now politics is introduced into the army, adding to its problems and troubles an internal conflict for which the armed forces are not prepared, either morally or physically. When the first "refuseniks" (those who had refused to swear allegiance to the Ukraine) arrived to Russian garrisons by planes, it turned out that they had not

been expected there at all. The army, even without this additional burden, can't cope with the problem of stationing the servicemen coming from Germany!

This is not a farce, this is a tragedy. Formally the rights of the servicemen are observed. Those who do not want to serve in the Ukraine and did not take the oath can leave the Ukraine right away or resign from the armed forces. In 1825 the wives of the Decembrists had to follow their husbands to Siberian prisons. The fate of the wives of those servicemen who have refused to swear allegiance to the Ukraine is not that dramatic — they will not have to go to Siberian garrisons. Yet you will agree with me that this procedure is deplorable enough, to say the least. No less humiliating is also the intension of the Ukrainian leadership to deny pensions to those reserve officers who, although living in the republic, don't want to be its citizens. Do they mean that a Russian WWII veteran will have to go to Russia to collect his pension, and an Uzbek will go to Uzbekistan?

So what is to be done? The easiest thing Russia can do is to urgently take countersteps. But why make officers and soldiers think over the problem of their origin; why not make them swear allegiance to, say, Tatarstan? The very moment one is forced to remember his ethnicity or religion a civilized society of humans ceases to exist. If independent armed forces are to be created, there is no need to aggravate the process with moral problems.

Besides, it should not be forgotten that the formation which has appeared on the territory of the former USSR does not exist in a vacuum but is surrounded by countries apprehensively watching what is taking place. It seemed to all of us that Yeltsin, Shushkevich, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev had given consideration to the anxiety of the world community over the destiny of Soviet nuclear weapons. However, the events that followed call this to doubt. Today there is the dispute over allegiance and the Black Sea Fleet. What will happen tomorrow?

It is necessary to remove urgently and unambiguously all such doubts. The Commonwealth has too many other problems and troubles to afford the dubious privilege of nuclear and other ambitions. We also can't afford to evoke suspicion in our neighbours by creating conflicts in the new-born Commonwealth. A commonwealth implies friendly cooperation of its members. Let us reserve Senate Square exclusively for strolls.



Lev
Bezymensky

**Do not
involve the
army in
politics,
do not
introduce
politics
into
the army**

"Gamsakhurdia's actions have jeopardized Georgian independence,"

New Times. After the September clashes between the opposition and the government, when troops opened fire on the demonstrators, you said things wouldn't calm down by themselves in Georgia. Early in January you said you were surprised at the turn events had taken. What did you expect and what you did not expect?

Eduard Shevardnadze. Frankly, I did not expect the people of Georgia to react so quickly to the outrages and arbitrariness of the Gamsakhurdia regime. I thought it would take longer for the people to wake up. It gives credit to my people that its most emancipated segments, and now, I think, the majority of society, was quick to realize the tragic consequences the president's rule could have brought to the country. Suffice it to recall the events in South Ossetia — no government in the civilized world can get away with such things. It is only one out of many examples.

NT. Gamsakhurdia was elected by a considerable majority, and the parliament initially supported him too...

E.S. The election returns were not accidental. People trusted him. They believed that he was committed to independence and democracy. However, Gamsakhurdia's actions jeopardized Georgian independence. A country isolated from the rest of the world cannot be free or independent. The policy of repressions, violations of both human rights and the interests of ethnic minorities, and disrespect for the rights of political parties have resulted in Georgia's virtual political, economic and moral isolation from the neighbouring Commonwealth countries, as well as Europe and the whole world. Many people in Georgia realized that policy was suicidal.

NT. Still, do you think it is lawful to overthrow a legitimate president?

E.S. Let us look at the problem from a slightly different angle. A man was elected president and then he virtually deceived his voters. People realized they were deceived pretty soon. By the way, a peaceful solution was also suggested: Gamsakhurdia could resign and new elections could be scheduled. In my opinion it would not be correct to proceed only from the premise that since Gamsakhurdia had been legitimately elected he could do whatever he pleased, staying in office until his term expired. Hitler was elected by the people too. We know how many lives had to be sacrificed later. That is why in this case my opinion is that it was the people who made Gamsakhurdia president and who then ousted him from power.

believes
Eduard Shevardnadze
who has recently
talked to
New Times'
political
analyst
Galina Sidorova

NT. It is difficult to visualize the British ousting their prime minister in a similar manner, or the French or the Americans doing the same to their presidents, even if their leaders committed gross violations...

E.S. Now look, try and visualize a group of MPs being kicked out of the British parliament because they have protested against some of the prime minister's decisions. There was such an instance in Georgia: representatives of the parties which the president did not like were expelled from parliament. You see what a terrible level of political illiteracy we have now. We are only starting to form democratic institutions, to say nothing of a democratic philosophy of society. The election of a parliament does not necessarily mean a triumph for democracy. In the countries you have just mentioned democratic institutions and traditions have been developing for decades, even centuries. At the initial stages they were not able to avoid excesses and cataclysms either. I believe what is happening in Georgia and the former Soviet republics is natural, to some extent.

NT. In other words, the opposition has dealt with the president the way the president did with the opposition?

E.S. I do not know how things will develop. I do not think the opposition had a choice. It was necessary to get rid of the previous regime. The situation would have been better, of course, if bloodshed had been avoided.

NT. Do you think the opposition had used all the political methods to settle the crisis before it took up arms?

E.S. I think, all methods were used in that very short time. Peaceful demonstrations were dispersed. As I have already said most opposition figures were expelled from the parliament on Gamsakhurdia's orders — the Supreme Soviet simply told them they were not members of parliament any longer. About a half of the initially elected deputies remained in parliament. It must be noted, however, that some of those who retained their seats tried to protest against the president's arbitrary ways of using power. Opposition representatives told me that they planned to convene all deputies and hold a session.

NT. Was Gamsakhurdia's stance during the August putsch in Moscow, when he supported the coup, an impetus to open confrontation between the president and the opposition?

E.S. I do not have much information about that.



The Government House in Tbilisi: flowers in memory of people killed in April 1989

I can only say what made me worry. On August 17 or 18 Gamsakhurdia said in parliament that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were going to be isolated. At that time I did not react to that statement: after all Gamsakhurdia had said many things before. When the putsch began, I immediately recalled Gamsakhurdia's statement and won-

dered whether it could be only a coincidence.

NT. The question is whom Gamsakhurdia hated more: the centre from which he had seceded, or personally Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. It seems that his hatred for these two figures was so strong, that he was even prepared to join the Union once again and

to associate himself with the coup leaders.

E.S. It looks like what you say is true. I would not say Gamsakhurdia hated Gorbachev. As for me, his attitude towards me was very special. I think you remember the insults and attacks he levelled against me so often. I did not respond. And I do not want to discuss it now. When the confrontation started I said that the only way out was the president's resignation. However, if it turns out that Gamsakhurdia did not personally commit any crimes, I do not see any reasons why he should be barred from participation in political life, in the creation of a new Georgia. And in case the charges against him are supported by evidence, he will face a trial.

NT. Why is Gamsakhurdia still supported by some segments of the population?

E.S. People just haven't had enough time to think things over. Many of his voters sincerely believed him and continue to trust him now. They are not to blame. It is necessary to be patient and tell them about what actually happened.

NT. However, Gamsakhurdia has publicly denied all charges...

E.S. Naturally, as long as there has not been a thorough investigation, it is too early to say to what extent the charges correspond to reality. Let us take just one fact. A torture chamber in the presidential bunker was shown over the TV. Eye-witnesses have told about

Is he a psycho?

Will Gamsakhurdia have to choose between the court and the mental hospital?

The deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia applies for political asylum in Armenia and gives interviews at his Idzhevan hideout confirming that he still sees himself as president. Pro-Gamsakhurdia meetings take place in Tbilisi every day showing that his influence in the republic is still great.

The victorious opposition wants Gamsakhurdia extradited. Dzhaba Ioseliani says Gamsakhurdia must face a trial. Tenghiz Sigua has recently hinted that the president may be mentally unstable. The figure of Gamsakhurdia continues to be an epicentre of passions. He and his entourage remain in the focus of attention,

while his health is becoming an element in the political game. The hints about insanity — are they really the truth, or attempts to discredit a legitimate president removed from office by armed force? The opposition promised to hold parliamentary elections in Georgia this spring. If nothing extraordinary happens, Gamsakhurdia will be elected member of parliament again — many people will vote for him. The opposition may be tempted to get him out of the way. The two simple methods of doing it are to try him or to lock him up in a mental home.

Who is Zviad Gamsakhurdia? What are his chances for returning to big-time politics?

Yuri Savenko, President of the Independent Psychiatric Association:

I am looking at Act No.20/c, the forensic-psychiatric examination of Zviad Konstantinovich Gamsakhurdia of September 26, 1977. In order to comment on this document issued by the Serbsky Institute of

Forensic Psychiatry it is first necessary to solve a number of other serious questions.

How ethical is the publication of such a document? The Independent Psychiatric Association advocates complete confidentiality of medi-

cal secrets, concrete liability for violators, and the right of any person to apply for psychiatric assistance voluntarily. We also oppose the publication of the dossiers concerning the huge army of people who were associated

with the secret police. However, the situation is different when it comes to people occupying prominent public or state positions, or claiming such positions. This is the practice of all democratic nations. As for Zviad Gamsakhurdia, his life and activities, as well as the opposition's statement about his possible, mental problems, are common knowledge.

The document published here had been issued by the Serbsky Institute which is notorious for its collaboration with the KGB in declaring any prominent dissident insane. Indeed we can see that the document is classified as secret and signed by people who had disgraced Soviet psychiatry before the whole world by committing gross psychiatric abuses. The docu-

tortures there. I cannot but believe journalists, many of whom I personally know to be very honest professionals.

NT. What segments of the population support Gamsakhurdia?

E.S. He's got more supporters in the provinces and fewer supporters in the capital.

NT. Do you think this can be explained by the fact that people in Georgian villages are more economically independent and economic hardships have a lesser impact on them?

E.S. I think that biased information is the main reason. The press, with very few exceptions, TV and radio were working for the government — the president took care of that. People living in the capital, in large cities had more opportunities to get informed about what was actually happening at the top. Today, I think, real media pluralism is necessary. Gamsakhurdia followers must be given access to the media too. People will have to make things clear for themselves.

NT. An onlooker may get the impression that what is happening in Georgia is a clash between two factions, while the population couldn't care less...

E.S. I do not think this would be the right impression. Do you remember how it all began? First there were peaceful demonstrations, the one on September 2, for example. On that day the situation was dramatic:




January 1992: a new round of violence

LASS photo

troops loyal to the president opened fire on the protesters. After that the National Guard decided to protect the people. It was a reasonable decision. However, I would not regard the National Guard as a regular army — very many of the Guardsmen are inexperienced and do not know how to handle guns properly. On the other hand, there is a

certain degree of organization in the National Guard. As far as I know when the shooting began in January and there appeared a real threat that unarmed people would be harmed, the opposition leaders ordered that all unarmed protesters return home.

NT. Is the former opposition united?



Zviad Gamsakhurdia underwent a psychiatric examination at the Serbsky Institute in 1977: a copy of the examination certificate

ment says that Gamsakhurdia consulted a psychiatrist at the age of 17 and two years later underwent a two-month forensic-psychiatric examination in Tbilisi. As a result he was certified as a responsible person diagnosed as having psychopathic inclinations and as having experi-

enced an episode of schizophrenia. Twelve years after that Zviad Gamsakhurdia developed a strong conviction that his family, his house and himself were exposed to constant "microwave or radioactive emanation." Gamsakhurdia lived seven years with this

conviction, and constantly called for an investigation into this matter.

As far as we remember shortly after the Serbsky examination Gamsakhurdia appeared on TV to renounce his dissident past. The KGB practices of those years cannot fail to make one suspect a case of blackmail and coercion, under which Gamsakhurdia had to do what he did for fear of being locked up in a special mental institution.

The material for a psychiatric analysis has significantly grown in volume since then and now includes Gamsakhurdia's statement that Moscow's secret service might have been involved in the Georgian earthquake, his messianic book about Georgia and other evidence presented by the Georgian opposition at the round-table discussion "Human rights in Georgia," held as part of the Moscow CSCE Conference. One piece of evidence was a Georgian psychiatrists' conviction that the president is a

psycho. The intention was to demand a psychiatric examination of the president through the parliament of Georgia.

One can't help asking why the opposition preferred to keep silent before.

In any case, the evidence presented here is sufficient to justify the demand for an independent psychiatric examination of Gamsakhurdia, an examination any president would have to undergo in similar circumstances.

In the spring of 1989 the Independent Psychiatric Association which is a full member of the World Psychiatric Association established an institute for carrying out independent psychiatric examinations. We are ready to form a representative commission which foreign experts will also take part in. Naturally, the person undergoing examination will have the right to object against specific commission members and ask that his own psychiatrists be present.

E.S. I do not think I am the best-informed source to answer this question. I have regular contacts with the opposition leaders. I do not sense any internal struggle there. Since the opposition unites representatives of many parties, people with different visions and philosophies, naturally there are occasional disputes. In my opinion the opposition's actions at this stage are quite concerted.

NT. Many events that have happened in Russia and other republics look more like a power struggle, not a democratic revolution. Do you think the situation may be the same in Georgia?

E.S. Let us make things clear. Who can be thirsty for power? Tenghiz Sigua? He had voluntarily stepped down as prime minister. I cannot say that he headed the opposition aiming for a higher office. I know Sigua — he is a reasonable and thinking person, he is not an adventurist or egoist. I think his resignation and coming to head the opposition were the steps he took on the grounds of his principles. Dzhaba Ioseliani? I have known him for a long time. He is a professor and brilliant playwright. As far as I know, he does not want any leading position for himself. He believes it is time to put an end to authoritarian rule and start moving towards democracy. According to him, he believes his mission is accomplished. Tenghiz Kitovani, the National Guard commander, was Gamsakhurdia's ally. He joined the opposition and took the side of the people. I have also met him. He is not a career politician. He made a statement stressing the necessity to form a government and dissolve the Military Council as soon as possible. Therefore, I rule out power struggle. It was a situation when somebody had to act, and they acted the way they thought they should.

NT. What do you think the situation may be like if Gamsakhurdia forms a government in exile?

E.S. Everything will depend on whether the new leaders will be able to cope with the challenges they are facing: to form an administration, to organize democratic elections — I think it will be useful to invite as many international observers as possible — and to start solving economic, social and other issues. The country is on the brink of catastrophe. There are no resources and there is a real threat of hunger. Ossets have started to

be driven away from South Ossetia and other regions. The number of refugees amounts to a hundred thousand. Now let us take the consequences of the natural calamities — whole districts are ruined, and no one cares to start rebuilding them. Besides, the opposition will have to demonstrate real art, great efforts, to drive society away from this really insane condition. They will be successful if they get people's support...

NT. It seems that Gamsakhurdia was too busy to bother about the economy.

E.S. My impression is that the president did not bother about the economy himself and did not like others to do it. When he was prime minister, Sigua was not allowed to do anything. Sovereignty and independence are worthwhile objectives. All republics and peoples were striving for them. Others acted in a more reasonable way, though: they preserved some economic ties, established relations with foreign countries and now they have at least some guarantees — against hunger for instance. In Georgia, industrial enterprises are isolated: they have neither resources nor reserves.

NT. Do you think the events may develop into a Lebanon-type drawn-out civil war, considering the fact that very many weapons are now in private possession?

E.S. Knowing my people, I still hope that the ideas of national reconciliation, peace and civilized ethnic relations will prevail. You can't live without them. In my short address to my people I tried to say that it is not the time to recall old grudges. Today people must display magnanimity, and forgive past offences.

NT. May there be a repeat of the January events?

E.S. It depends. There may be excesses, some individual protests, but the people of Georgia are mostly in favour of the democratic way.

NT. What is your idea of your personal role in Georgia's future?

E.S. I am prepared to do everything in my power. I have addressed the current Georgian leadership suggesting that a Georgian revival foundation be set up. They have already opened a bank account in Tbilisi. I have appealed to the world community. However, there will be no big donations for the time being. People in the West, and in the Common-

wealth too, are not sure how things would end and what regime they will have to deal with tomorrow. The republic's image is very negative now. We have to prove that we are committed to democracy. If we prove it we will have support of the Commonwealth, independent on whether Georgia joins it or not. It is also necessary for Georgia, in my opinion, to join the European process. It will be possible for Georgia to join this process only if Georgian laws and practices correspond to the European standards. Georgia should also join the world process. It sounds strange: a small country and the world process. But a lot of small states play a significant role in the international arena.

NT. The small country is short of big leaders...

E.S. I have no doubt that leaders will appear. Talented and capable people used to be kept away from political life. In the new situation they will have a chance to appear.

NT. Are you going to run for presidency in Georgia?

E.S. I have not thought about that. I do not know how things will go. If there is a younger and more promising person, why should I stand in the way? I have no personal ambitions. As leader of the Foreign Policy Association, I am engaged in work that is very useful, for Georgia too.

NT. Suppose the new leaders have something to offer you. What post would you agree to occupy?

E.S. We have not discussed it. There are people in Georgia who get annoyed when somebody says Shevardnadze may come back. If people want me, I will participate in the political life, but if they don't, I will do so anyway. It is the duty of any decent person to be together with his or her people.

NT. To what extent can the developments in Georgia be viewed as a reflection on processes under way in other former Union republics? Do you think Georgia-like events may occur there?

E.S. Leaders must think the situation over and draw conclusions. The events in Georgia are a serious lesson. If the basic principles of democracy are ignored in other places, the same can happen elsewhere. People just don't want to live in a society without freedom.

ВОЛГА В ДНЕПР



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Gorbachev's many faces, or an Ode

Alexander Pumpyansky

Work on the 20-episode documentary *The Great Patriotic War* (the US title: "The Unknown War") was in progress. It was to open with an interview with Brezhnev. However, Brezhnev's opening address written for him by Andrei Alexandrov, his aide and a consultant of the film's director, turned out to be too long. But who could dare to slash a Brezhnev speech? Alexandrov racked his brains for a way out of the predicament. A clever professional, he saw at once that he would have to do the impossible, and only moaned: "You don't love Leonid Ilyich!" The editors modestly dropped their eyes.

The interview was cut down, but the question remained. Is it necessary to love leaders? Is it permissible not to love them? Are they to be loved for the duration of their lifetime only, and not a moment longer?

I think I know why my wilful memory has brought this seemingly long-forgotten incident back to me: The "Brezhnev case" has taken nine years to solve, and the Stalin myth has been dispelled over 38 years after his death. Our affection for Lenin has lasted longer, for about seventy years, but now we have fallen out of love with him, too. It is true that Chernenko failed to catch the nation's fancy in his lifetime, but who knows what would have happened if God had endowed him with a sounder pair of lungs? We might well have fallen for that leader who was so unassuming, so down-to-earth and as folksy as the next man...

As to Gorbachev, there was a time when I hated his guts.

The conference was held in the fifth-floor Marble Hall, the holy of holies of the CPSU Central Committee building. Gorbachev introduced the most democratic practice of consulting various sections of the public, the press included. As a matter of fact, journalists were consulted on rare occasions, and even then the tone was set by the "mastodons" — the imposing editors-in-chief of party and state journals. But still... That time, however, the session was reduced to a frank monologue, and the monologue was horrible.

What the speaker had to tell us became an oft-repeated tune afterwards. He pounced upon the "so-

called democrats," upon the "irresponsible press," that gang of slanderers and mud-slingers, upon the ambitious careerists who had the nerve to aspire to power (as if those then in office had assumed power by divine predestination!)

I had never heard Gorbachev talk like that before. What's more, he was being personal. His targets were Sakharov, Yeltsin, Yury Afanasyev, Popov — the entire Inter-Regional Group, in short. Incidentally, Popov came under less criticism than he deserved: as editor-in-chief of an economic journal, he was conspicuously present there in person, and Gorbachev was shy of saying unpleasant things right to somebody's face...

The main brunt of criticism fell on Starkov of *Argumenty i Fakty*. He was also present at the session, but had modestly selected a seat well away from the podium. Besides, Gorbachev did not know him by sight. That did not help, though. "Is Starkov here?" the speaker asked angrily, and the question, which sounded like a clap of thunder in the ominous quiet, was, in itself, an indictment against, a verdict and an invitation to the scaffold for the insolent who ought to be filled with shame and wish the earth would open and swallow him up. The *Argumenty i Fakty* was guilty of having carried a politically "inappropriate" and, no doubt, "biased" selection of letters to the editor from which it followed that not all the Soviet people were enthusiastic about the initiator of *perestroika*. For such a heinous crime, the editor certainly merited public execution. The fact that the editor had turned, in a matter of few years, a shabby tabloid of the Znaniye (Knowledge) society into nationally popular paper detracted nothing from his guilt but was, rather, an aggravating circumstance...

Gorbachev ended the session on a harsh note: he said all he wanted to say, and now we had something to think about. He left abruptly, without even giving the cheerleaders a chance to turn on a chorus of approval. In a long corridor of the Central Committee building I buttonholed a lonely Gavriil Popov so as to try and talk away the nasty taste the session had left in my mouth. Popov tacitly acknowledged this token of solidarity and remarked meaningfully that if Gorbachev wanted an opposition party, he would get it.

The theme of friends and foes, of allies and opponents was always one of the leads in the chorus of voices which commented, like the Greek choir,

Should we
love the
leaders?
Can one fail
to love
them?

to the hesitant leader

on the hero's actions. The standard refrain was that he was a poor judge of people, mistook foes for friends, alienated his natural allies and invited opposition. Examples abound: the Ligachev-Yakovlev dichotomy, the unseemly behaviour towards Sakharov, the hollow Yeltsin affair which emerged from a whim, and, of course, the indiscriminate selection of his closest entourage which resulted in the August 1991 putsch. The menials he had hand-picked for top government posts bit the hand that fed them because the hand proved not strong enough, and its owner didn't want it stained with blood.

Poor Yorick, that is King Lear! But do we really want to see a Macbeth in his place? Or that hunchback, Richard III, who stopped at nothing and spared no one?

After each political clash — and there were plenty of them, beginning with the first one for the crown of the Russian Empire at the March 1985 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee — the public admired or cursed Gorbachev's cunning, but I think it is high time we noted his simple-heartedness and sincerity, unusual in a politician.

He sincerely opened the valve of glasnost — there was no putting up with the disgrace of mouth-gagging any longer — and he as sincerely voiced his indignation over the fact that instead of ear-pleasing harmony the voices suddenly became discordant, noisy and far from laudatory. The intelligentsia shouldn't complain that he shook a fist at it for, when unclenched, the "fist" proved to contain the most precious things: lists of rehabilitated names, of once arrested books, of the films and plays which had been "shelved." Upon tasting the forbidden fruit of a free unsuppressed thought, the ungrateful intelligentsia began to commit worse sins than ever. Naturally, he took offence at it for that. He lifted censorship of the written word, but none of the democrats displayed responsibility and decency enough to exercise self-control. While mixing with foreign leaders he was a citizen of the world eager to uphold the values of civilization as a single whole, only to turn into Soviet socialist patriot as he returned to his own partocratic element. The former had a stronger appeal to him, no doubt, but he would never admit that, even to himself, perhaps. He was sincere.

He started reforming Soviet society in good faith, and got really scared when the reforms overflowed their banks and swept across the vast expanses of Russia, drawing everything in their way into their whirlpool. He gave democracy to our society, so why did it continue to fight, preventing the initiator of *perestroika* from making the people happy?

King Lear? Who's missing Macbeth?

No, he wasn't double-faced. He was a statesman of many faces. By some miracle, he represented all the basic types on the Soviet political scene, revealed by the time of the great turning point.

In the beginning he was, indeed, two-faced, one face named Ligachev and the other Yakovlev.

The liberal intelligentsia wondered why Gorbachev did not listen to the liberal and clever man like Yakovlev, and for how long he would put up with and even cultivate the diehard and the neo-Stalinist like Ligachev. Did not he see what all the nation was well aware of — that there lay the root of all evil.


On their part, numerous Party activists maintained that everything would have gone well but for the gentle character of the General Secretary who somehow could not part with the irresponsible visionary and revisionist in the Politburo. They couldn't understand Gorbachev's motives, but well, he was the boss...

The trouble, however, lay not in Gorbachev taking his time about deciding between his two associates who were poles apart. Not that one appealed to Gorbachev by his intellect and his new ideas, and the other by his death-grip of a bulldozer and his push of a bulldozer. For Gorbachev, that was a choice between two varieties of good, not between good and evil.

Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev was a classical product of the system, its knight without fear and reproach. Indicatively, Andropov himself had picked him out of the lot and put him in charge of the selection, training and placement of personnel for the Party *apparatus* — a vital sphere of activity (as Stalin put it, "cadres decide all").

A mental outlook reduced to the narrowness of a laser beam, with everything distracting people from the "main thing" cut off, has always been regarded as purposefulness in this country. Strict obedience to instructions from above, from the Party *apparatus* which deemed it its mission and even its duty to rule nature and society by decree was synonymous with efficiency...

On the other flank, there was Yakovlev. Feeling rather lonesome in the upper echelon of power among his former friends who no longer regard him as one of them and the new men who haven't quite accepted him yet, he has been compelled, until quite recently, to conceal the fact that in his mind the dogma had long given way to doubt and common sense, and that conscientiousness had melted Bolshevik straightforwardness down. Surrounded with cynical atheists, Yakovlev, curiously, hankered after faith — hence his disappointments; a



proud man, he wanted to acquire faith on his own terms, not mindlessly or by order, but through reflections. Yakovlev is also a child of the System — after all, he has spent 40 years in the corridors of power — but an illegitimate child, as it were.

Ligachev and Yakovlev, initially the two wings of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, have become its two rival models.

What we have to do is to make radical personnel changes, replace the First Party Secretaries who have held their posts for years at a stretch and who are obviously stagnating, by the vigorous and non-corrupt Second Secretaries, screen out the incompetent, speed up progress — and then things will take their course. In this way we shall be able to renovate socialism, to disclose its temporarily dormant potential. Such was *perestroika à la Ligachev*, and it was the first to get its chance.

Nothing came of it.

The harder Ligachev tried, the worse things were going, and not solely through his own fault. The ridiculous, and in many ways tragical, campaign to get alcohol out of real and improved socialism's way has become a classic. The thought of the financial damage, worth tens of billions of rubles, this campaign has done, let alone its more serious consequences which do not lend themselves to calculation, drives one to sedition. One wishes Ligachev weren't so righteous. Had he simply stolen a million or two, or even more, in proportion to his needs, that would have been mere chickenfeed. Because if the Supreme Court ever rules that he should make up for the damage done to society by his vigorous and altruistic effort, even eternity won't be long enough for him to settle with us, and so we shall have to make him immortal, which is an unthinkable punishment.

It has turned out that the System's supreme meaning, its rationale, consists solely in self-reproduction and self-preservation. The more dedication the System's most efficient man showed in serving his cause, the more damage he did to society. The sybarites and bribe takers of the stagnation epoch are not worth to hold a candle to him: at least they did nothing, thank God. But when even the most honest adherents of the System do irreparable damage to society, this suggests the only conclusion that the System has outlived itself.

No, reshuffles and cosmetic surgery won't suffice. The System is in need of real reforms, a thorough airing and humanization. Such was Yakovlev's idea of *perestroika* — a noble one, no doubt, but marked by starry-eyed idealism.

An attempt to reform the Party System was bound to end in the expulsion of the reformer from the ranks (which, it is true, are not as serried as they used to be) and in an inevitable self-explosion of both the Party and the System. That actually happened when *perestroika* was in its sixth year, and in the meantime its leader was busy resolving the dilemma: which track was right?

He got the answer at last after the Party's upper crust had revealed at its forum the strongman's

basic defect which consisted in everyone being sick and tired of him.

As a matter of fact, it had long been time to decide which course of economic reform to take. What followed was another long spell of enchantments and disappointments, bold initiatives and inexplicable retreats.

Shatalin, and later Yavlinsky, made a brilliant analysis of the self-adjusting market mechanisms and held up luring prospects of our integration into the world economy. Enough of incompetent meddling in economics! There is no place in it for Party bigwigs and Red Commissars! Economics for economists!

In a confidential report, Kryuchkov, however, pointed out that Harvard schools were not quite above board, that capitalism remained capitalism, that the CIA was not asleep, although Bush was a decent person, and that the main thing, the Party, the army and the military-industrial complex were filled with concern; and these represented the flower of our glorious working class and intelligentsia, so why should we offend them? And besides, Boldin kept bringing in alarming reports and analyses... Those men were no Solomons, of course, but could be relied upon. Besides, it was their professional duty to feel the pulse of the nation. We have to decide on a golden mean. If we cross Shatalin with Kryuchkov, and Boldin with Yavlinsky, we'll get Pavlov. He is young, a hear-economist, has had an experience of work as a revenue inspector (don't our learned economists give top priority to the improvement of our finance?), not an ideologist; a technocrat; last but not least, he is obedient and does as he is told.

On those memorable three days in August, Gorbachev found himself between the hammer and the anvil, between Yeltsin and the State Emergency Committee; I shall even use a shocking analogy: during all these years he was Yeltsin and the State Emergency Committee rolled in one.

The Yeltsin part was OK, but what about the Emergency Committee?

I had occasion to express my opinion about the political physiognomy of practically every one of the eight some known as the State Emergency Committee both before and after the putsch. Now, however, as they are whiling away the time in the Matrosskaya Tishina prison and when it is becoming increasingly clear that they are no "healthy forces," but simply old and ill dim-wits I feel like protecting them, paradoxical as it sounds.

What have they done wrong, which state laws have they broken?

**If the ears
of Kryuchkov
were attached
to the forehead
of Shatalin...**

All right, they placed the President under house arrest and removed him from power, either temporarily or for good. So what? In this country, a takeover of power by conspirators is nothing new, and candidates for the top post have always been decided upon behind closed doors, by a narrow circle of VIPs who had

confidence in themselves only.

All right, they sent the tanks rolling to blackmail their own people. This is nothing new, either. I could cite precedents, but the crux of the matter is that this state has been set up as a state of violence and dictatorship (the good old clichés "revolutionary violence" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" mean exactly that).

All right, they have lied to us. But who hadn't? We had heard bigger lies before: about the "conquests of the revolution," for instance. Actually, the revolution had conquered us and created a regime of one-man rule which all the tyrannies of the past pale before. We had been told lies about "socialism," the "dream of mankind," and about "accursed capitalism."

About the past and the future and, first and foremost, about the present in which we lived a well-to-do and worthy life and were even the world's second biggest industrialized power (it would obviously be laying it on too thick to claim that we led the world in economic progress).

We hold an all-time world record for the number of those slandered. It is impossible to rehabilitate all of them individually, name by name, so they have to be rehabilitated in terms of common graves, classes and whole nations. Under atheistic socialism there is no Last Judgement, there is only posthumous rehabilitation.

Surely, those mountains of lies dwarf the tiny lie about the President having suddenly fallen ill.

That was not even a lie, as a matter of fact, just a stratagem. They did not transgress the laws of this state created by Lenin and Stalin, which remained practically unchanged until quite recently. On the contrary, they acted in strict accordance with the laws which had always governed it.

The state is criminal, of course, but no such verdict has been passed yet, otherwise there would have been no drive to pardon all those this state has destroyed.

In the night of August 18/19 true patriots of this state tried to save it. Actually they finished it off, which is also logical and natural in its own way. The System has devoured itself.

We were all shocked by those men now trying to unseat Gorbachev, now seeking his protection. But the real enigma and drama lie elsewhere — in Gorbachev trying, over the years, to destroy this state and to preserve it at the same time, and nearly succeeding in that.

Gorbachev was the target of attacks and the source of hopes. This dual nature helped him gain time until the changes became irreversible

Was he really just an intermediate figure in the transition from one monumental leader to another, or from an authorita-

rian to a determined reformer? No, he was an epitome of Transition!

The naive and rather vague word "perestroika," which we liked so much, did not really reflect even a fraction of what was going on. It was necessary not to restructure individual institutions or even the entire System, but to revolutionize everything — the social-economic system, the political regime, the system of government, the relationships with the outside world — such were History's sealed instructions to the young and ambitious Party functionary who had manoeuvred himself (or been manoeuvred by fate, if you will) into office seven years ago.

Just seven years ago, now I come to think of it! And we still reproach this man with what Cunctator had

been in ancient Rome — slowness and indecision — we even find convincing proof of that, and charge that Gorbachev has merely gone through the motions of the reform instead of carrying it out. Over the period, Eastern Europe has been set free without a single casualty, not counting the officers and men of the Soviet army who have no place to live in at home. But what kind of a country is it, what kind of an empire, which cannot take proper care even of its own army? This alone goes to show that the empire is long dead... The peoples of the Baltic have got their freedom. Could anyone imagine that this freedom would cost them so little blood (excuse the involuntary cynicism)? Colonial expeditions and wars, which took a heavy toll of our young manhood and swallowed up billions of rubles, are over... So are worldwide confrontation, the Cold War and the insane race of attrition...

Communism — the greatest mystification in human history which covered up the worst brand of totalitarianism — is dead. The absolutely inhuman and therefore inevitably deadlocked, trend of social anti-development, with the natural laws called off, and with several generations forced to build an unheard-of pyramid of autocracy, has come to an end.

All this has happened over less than seven years under a leader who would make two steps backwards after making a step forward, as we vexedly commented on his policy then. For all I can tell, he might well have been a blessing in disguise: A stronger leader would have long landed us in a Tiananmen or a Timisoara. As it happened, the indecision of that man of many faces, who came under fire from every quarter but whom, nevertheless, most people identified with, was a factor in radical changes running their course unopposed until they finally became irreversible.

Gorbachev's personality apart, his so-called indecision reflected the insolubility of the problems,



all of which are to be solved immediately in the historical impasse we have now reached. We are so anxious to get to paradise, but there is no straight road leading to paradise, all the roads pass across hell. We have been standing still for too long, and this stagnation cannot go on. We have to overcome our fears of the unknown and get moving. We must make that transition.

Over the last few months Gorbachev has displayed a liking for the story of

Moses, who had led his people around the desert for forty years until all those who remembered slavery died off. At the latest public meeting he also referred to that Biblical personage as if seeking protection and justification for his actions in it.

That was a farewell meeting with the press arranged by Andrei Grachev, the chief of the President's press service. The newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* was not invited, but the *Vzglyad* (View) TV programme, which didn't change its views, and all the media which had made full use of the chance *glasnost* gave them, were. They had been in more or less consistent and successful opposition to Gorbachev all through those years — honest opposition, which makes all the difference between democracy and authoritarianism. Besieged by those wishing to say goodbye to him, Gorbachev moved from group to group. I couldn't help noting that he gave most of his time to Starkov, the *Argumenty i Fakty* editor, who had never been fired. I had the impression that they cleared the air.

Atheistic socialism has no concept of the Last Judgement, but only that of posthumous rehabilitation

It was with *glasnost* that Gorbachev's reformation had started, and it was to the men of *glasnost* that he came at the end. He had no allies truer than them.

Why am I writing about him in the past tense? Because I am parting with the epoch, not with Gorbachev.

There is a legend about a king seeking a 'Pythoness' advice on whether to attack a neighbouring state. You will destroy a great state, the soothsayer told him. And so he went ahead and attacked the neighbour. The result was the destruction of a great state — his own.

Some reproach Gorbachev with having destroyed a great state, an empire which kept its citizens in submission and kept the whole world in awe. That, alas, was the work of History, and there is nothing anyone can do about it. That the state is our own gives a tragical dimension to what is going on.

Caught between the bloody, but nevertheless beloved, past and the promising, but as yet mysterious future, our present has found its concentrated expression in Gorbachev who, whether he likes it or not, has come to symbolize this time of great confusion.

Gorbachev has nothing to be ashamed of. He can by right be proud of what happened when he was in office. For as long as we maintain the tradition of giving human names to historical milestones and epochs, this important chapter will bear his name. I hope we shall live to see our state governed not by leaders who are to be loved or hated, worshipped or cursed, but by normal administrators whom we shall elect for a certain term in office.

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Three resignations

I shall long keep the memory of President Gorbachev's last television appearance. He said all he wanted to say, and did it with dignity and to the point. As I listened to his address, I couldn't help comparing the present situation with what had happened almost three decades ago, after the October (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Khrushchev was toppled at that session. He sat at the presidium table, among his former friends and colleagues. I knew Khrushchev well as a strong, self-confident man hardened in the Satan's crucible of Stalin; and now there he was, shrivelled and scared, as if facing an immediate execution. I knew that at the closed session of the Central Committee Presidium he had asked to give him a chance to say a few words of farewell to the members of the Central Committee, maybe to apologize for something or perhaps he just didn't want to keep silent on that sad occasion which marked an end of his lifework.

Brezhnev's reaction to that request was: "What's the use, we've heard all you've got to say." And Khrushchev left in silence.

As I listened to Gorbachev, I recalled another Plenum of the Central Committee, held in June 1957, to deal with Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others who had conspired to overthrow Khrushchev and to bring back the Stalinist methods of running the state. The Plenum lasted for a few days.

When it was over, Kaganovich wrote a note to Khrushchev, asking him not to punish them Stalin-style, i.e., by death. For the first time in the history of our much-suffering country people accused of a political crime were not executed.

While listening to Gorbachev, I thought about the enormous progress our society had made over the past few years in overcoming fear, once a bane of our life.

A large amount of fear still remains in our society, however, complete with its nasty concomitants: flattery, servility, revengefulness... This humiliating feeling, which depersonalizes human beings, has been implanted in our mentality, in our physiology even, for too long and too ruthlessly. Lenin had declared with shocking bluntness that he no longer regarded as his friends those whom he parted company with politically. That

principle of his had misfired once. He tried to break with Stalin who had insulted his wife, but it was too late. Dying in Gorky was not just the over-ambitious but crippled leader of the Party and founder of the state, but actually a prisoner held in custody by Stalin himself. Stalin had been the first to break with Lenin.

Khrushchev reminisced that in the last years of his life Stalin, when in a state of depression, would hiss at his retainers: "My death will be the end of you. Lenin wrote a testament and set all of us at loggerheads with one another." That testament was probably a thorn in Stalin's flesh till the end. First made public after the 20th Party Congress, it had been kept under lock and key before that. In the thirties, anyone caught reading this document would be shot without trial. Tens of millions of people were under a continuous and humiliating surveillance. The writer Ilya Ehrenburg, who was well familiar with the situation then, remarked once: "If the telephone in your flat fell silent, if your close friends stopped recognizing you, the tragical finale was just a step away."

This feeling of fear infected even the most courageous of men. After Marshal Zhukov, the great soldier, had fallen into disgrace, his former comrades-in-arms began to cut him dead. Upon seeing him they would cross over to the other side of the street lest they should have to salute him and be "caught in the act" by someone they knew.

My own telephone kept silent for very long. Sometimes I got the illusion that I heard it ringing; I would pick up the receiver, but all I heard was an even drone of the membrane.

It was for many personal reasons that I heard out Gorbachev's address with great attention. I did not want the telephone in his apartment to be silent. I wanted him to be still addressed as President, which is standard practice in civilized countries, because such a form of address as used with regard to a retired President is a sign of self-respect above all. It does not make the person in question the object of eulogy or immune to criticism motivated by the desire to get the measure of the times.

We seem to be getting rid of our old fears; nevertheless I am somehow uneasy in my mind. Will Gorbachev's phone go dead?

Alexei Adzhubei

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**HOBOE
ВРЕМЯ**

Andrei Kozyrev:

“And yet Russia is destined to be a great power...”

Our correspondent in the former Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs watches the old walls assume Russian national colours. Russia's Foreign Minister is interviewed by *New Times* political analyst **Galina Sidorova**

“**Q** uite fitting to be entered into the Guinness Book of Records,” said the assistant to the minister looking at his watch meaningfully as I left his boss's study. I doubt that Guinness envisaged records of that kind; however, it was my longest interview I'd ever taken from a Soviet or foreign public figure. It is possible that the new host of the ministerial office was not yet annoyed by journalists or, probably, there are still more questions than answers in our life, including politics.

Galina Sidorova. What do you feel you are in this office — a successor or an overthrower?

Andrei Kozyrev. Well, I think I am a successor, nevertheless. There is nothing to be overthrown here. This structure must undergo a transfiguration. Generally speaking, I adhere to exactly this concept. There has been *perestroika*. Before it, there was acceleration. I choose transfiguration, this word is rooted in Christian culture. In the practical sense, this ministry, as well as the country as a whole, doesn't need to destroy anything to the ground, as we used to do. But it would be strange to believe that everything works right and must be left as it has been. Would you like to hear an old anecdote popular in this office when I worked in the Union MFA? Question: How many people work in your ministry? Answer: about 30 percent ... Well, seriously speaking — about 75 or 80 percent of the personnel. So, a reduction is no doubt a necessity. And a few more words about the transfiguration. The problem is that we, in the course of overcoming a confrontational style of thinking, have inherited its stereotypes, having replaced negative, aggressive ones with positive ones — universal human values understood somewhat abstractly. Links with reality have been severed. First we taught everyone class struggle, then we lectured on shared human values, while the world community continued its normal and harmonious development. In short, it's high time we, transfiguring ourselves, did not behave like an elephant in a pottery shop.

G.S. Nevertheless, foreign policy during *peres-*

troika was a sort of locomotive for the Union which hauled it into civilization, into the world community. Do you think that Russia's foreign policy may fulfil the same functions for Russia?

A.K. Generally speaking, this is my dream. Incidentally, I've been Gorbachev's active supporter since 1985. I remember how enthusiastic we felt about us, in this office, promoting the transference of the civilizational potential to this country. It is true though that the task of the MFA consisted largely in dispelling the old ideological incantations and introducing new ones. I remember the highlight of our efforts — into Gorbachev's speech in the United Nations and later in Strasbourg, we managed to insert the words about the unconditional support of the Declaration of Human Rights, the entire text of the latter being a challenge to the communist system. Later difficulties came, as was the case with *perestroika* as a whole — decisions and actions were to be made in accordance with the declaration. However, at this moment there appeared a desire to hold onto the socialist option. Now that the struggle against the ideological monsters is over, I see our task as attracting as much civilizational potential as possible towards really implementing change. I envisage tremendous difficulties, including those of creating state mechanisms capable of perceiving these ideas. Besides, the public mentality itself is not yet free from primitive demagoguery inherited from former party structures. One can say that it has only started to be formed.

G.S. There is evidently another difficulty too — the growing discrepancy between the foreign and internal policies brought about by the economic collapse in the country. Aren't you afraid that you'll have problems too? Even if the present reforms begin to work, the crisis will at first only deepen...

A.K. We are already having these problems and, of course, our possibilities are limited. Yet every cloud must have a silver lining. The economic reality, for instance, forces us to leave troubled regions in which we, due to the inertia of our



Photo by Eduard Pesov

bureaucratic structures, supported our ideological allies literally until just recently. The aid extended to Najibullah's regime in Afghanistan is being discontinued only now, and that is largely due to economic reasons. As for me, I would have stopped it for political reasons. I don't think that we owe anything to our ideological allies. I won't be too upset either if the building of aircraft carriers is stopped because of economic difficulties and the money is channeled into the carrying out of more pressing tasks, such as economic and technological revival of Russia's grandeur. Our general poverty causes troubles in the carrying out of our diplomatic functions. This morning I had a headache about the forthcoming conference on the Middle East to be convened in Moscow late this January. On the one hand, that would be the triumph of Russia as the hostess of the event; on the other, however, economic troubles and the chaos of the transitional period create problems.

G.S. To the best of my knowledge, the then Foreign Minister of the Union, Boris Pankin, promised to James Baker in Madrid that the Union would allocate a million dollars as the Soviet contribution to the Madrid stage of the Middle East Conference. The Americans, naturally, waited for this contribution in vain and subsequently made believe, tactfully, that they had forgotten about it. However, no smaller expenses are expected in Moscow.

A.K. Millions of dollars were spent on the Madrid Conference. An analogous way of financing would have simply closed the question of its next stage being in Moscow. But since the conference is international, a number of countries are willing to help. If the

ization. This place of ours is still there. Just like Dostoyevsky and Pushkin...

G.S. But our poverty...

A.K. People think not only in economic terms alone. Even a poor country Pushkin is still Pushkin. Dostoyevsky remains Dostoyevsky. This is, by the way, understood by our friends abroad. And we ourselves must have a sense of history too. Yes, we are poor now and waste our time on standing in lines. All this is repulsive, it irritates: a great power — and we are one in any event, whether within a Union or without it: within the Commonwealth or not, preferably, of course, within (by the way, personally I have always upheld and still uphold the idea of a union) — has nothing to wear. And yet we are destined to be a great power.

G.S. Whatever we might say about the period of *perestroika*, the dominant idea of 1985 — that of returning to civilization, of universal human values — is essentially more progressive than national egoism which became the banner of the 1991 revolution...

A.K. I have nothing against universal human values and, I repeat it, I have enthusiastically struggled for their introduction into our political vocabulary. Without a doubt this was a breakthrough. I am only against the abstract morality so annoying in the new political thinking. So what are these universal human values? These are an individual human being's values, his rights. These are the rights of peoples, their right to national self-identity. And it is stipulated by all universally recognized legal documents — the Charter of the United Nations,

dollar part of the expense is covered, we will be able to cover the part of the expense in rubles and manage the affair. It's highly important politically — Russia must demonstrate that it is going to be no worse a partner in the Middle East settlement than its predecessor, or even a more active one. This has also economic implications — the world's business people watch us closely. If Russia is unable to hold even this event three days long, how is it possible to invest there?

Generally, I believe it's too early to discard Russia as a great power.

The great poor one

G.S. So what is our grandeur then?

A.K. Grandeur is determined both by the size and, if you prefer, by the place we occupy in what is called Western, or European civilization.

the CSCE documents in which the right of nations to self-determination is coupled with the priority of personal rights which means precisely a considerate stance towards ethnic groups. Esteem towards any ethnic minority is, in general, a sign that a state is civilized. A normal Russian state is a continuation of Russian culture's historical traditions. However, all people and ethnic groups living in it side by side must feel free. If you enjoy the right to national self-consciousness, you must recognize it with regard to any other person. I see no contradictions between universal human values and national values.

G.S. Take for example Transcaucasia, Moldova, the Ukraine. Their citizens are literally obsessed with nationalism which forces their leaders to take steps they will probably regret in the future.

A.G. Of course, if the formation of national states on the territory of the former Union is carried out on ethnic or racial principles — in other words, on the principles of national exclusiveness — it will be a terrible experience. The demand expressed by US State Secretary James Baker — I will add for the justice's sake that we have also spoken about it — that the new states must behave in conformity with the set of universal human values clearly formulated in the legal documents of the CSCE, is also in the interests of the peoples concerned and warns them against the "barbarous nationalism" of the 18th-19th centuries.

Sweet is the fruit of victory, but it is not enough for everyone

G.S. Won't Russia's foreign policy be impaired by the former Union states' hectic desire to divide all and everything?

A.K. Of course, it will. It's in the nature of the *lumpen-proletariat* to divide all and everything. This approach is still sufficiently strong in our mentality, because we are not only Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, we are all Soviet people, and there is nothing to be done about it. The only real danger for us may lie in a combination of Soviet mentality and nationalism.

G.S. Politicians are in a hurry to make use of the fruits of victory. The impression is that there won't be enough for all. I've been told that Ukrainian representatives demanded a separate elevator in the building of the former Union mission in the United Nations in New York, not to mention other and more serious expenses, embassies became Russian...

A.K. Yes, former Soviet embassies became Russian. 12 states, not to count the Baltic ones, appeared on the territory of the Union. Far from all of them have been recognized by the world community. Russia has been recognized by practically all countries. Many have recognized the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The problem has arisen of retaining continuity in interna-

tional relationships, including foreign missions. Both we and Western lawyers agreed on the concept of continuity — there must be a state succeeding to the Soviet Union. This is not equivalent to a monopolist successor. Legal successors to the Union are all former republics. Russia is the Union's largest part. After the presidential elections and as a result of the August putsch the Russian government is considered as meeting democratic standards. What's more, Russia did not declare independence while other republics did. This is important from the point of view of international law, because, in conformity with the Convention on Succession of States, the seceded parts are those which declare their independence. So Russia is the remaining part.

G.S. Does this mean that Russia didn't declare independence because it had far-reaching plans for the future?

A.K. There were no property-oriented plans. It is rather a matter of our restraint. President Yeltsin used to repeat: Russia will be the last to declare its own currency and army. We adhered to the concept of a Union to the last moment; it's another matter that we upheld the idea of a union with equal rights for all. Now Russia, as the successor of the Union, assumes its responsibilities and obligations — the seat on the Security Council and co-chairmanship shared with the Americans of the Middle East Conference.

A dozen of "legal subjects" in one embassy?

G.S. But other successor states to the former Union probably also have legal interests in the premises of former Soviet embassies and they also have rights to some property?

A.K. The embassies of foreign states in the Soviet Union, which is no more, are in Moscow. The independent states, former republics, naturally want to open some of them in their countries. But what comes of it? For instance, our present embassy in Paris and the land it is situated on were exchanged for land and a mansion in Moscow on the basis of mutual consent. Which means that the Ukraine, if it wants to establish independent diplomatic relations with France and have a French embassy in Kiev, must also grant land and a mansion and conclude a corresponding ambassadorial agreement in accordance with its own laws. It only stands to reason that in that case a certain territory would be granted in Paris for the Ukrainian embassy — on the same principle of mutual consent. It follows that what has been exchanged for a plot of land and premises in Moscow becomes automatically Russian property. A zero variant. Everything that has been located on the territory of other republics is theirs and what has been situated on ours is ours. Otherwise the process of property division will last indefinitely. In short, if we embark on the path of division we will stop working altogether.

G.S. Can partners in the Common-

wealth count on compensation?

A.K. 80 to 90 percent of all expenditures on maintenance of embassies is met by Russia, which does not mean that others will be denied the right to use this property. It is rather difficult to calculate each former republic's share in it. According to our estimations, the Ukraine's share is 7-8 to 15 percent. For small republics it varies from a fraction of 1 percent to 1 percent. We would like everyone to be able to work under one roof. This arrangement will require a settlement, and with the country of residence too: one legal subject, the Soviet Union, is replaced by a dozen. Russia intends to help its neighbours build and open their own embassies. This is also a kind of compensation. At the moment we take no rent. For instance, former Central Asian republics may refrain from having their own embassies in some countries for the lack of finance and trained personnel. It is very easy to sign an agreement to the effect that some state or another is represented by the Russian ambassador, in whose office there will be diplomats from, say, Turkmenia or Kyrgyzstan.

G.S. The problem evidently is that all secessionist republics suspect each other, and especially Russia, of evil designs, they are afraid lest it assume the role of a centre and start to take a leading role...

A.K. There is only one way out — to settle each case separately. I think we will overcome suspicion. As concerns embassies, we invite cooperation from all, we are even ready not to count dollars which are so scarce with us. After all, they are our close neighbours. It doesn't matter much if we spend a little more than their share on diplomats from Central Asian republics, for we are interested in their joining of the world community together with us. I hope that Russia's financial organs will cooperate in this matter.

G.S. Judging by what you say, you favour coordination of foreign policy by all republics. Yet far from all member states of the Commonwealth are of the same opinion. Where is the way out?

A.K. The outcome of my contacts with colleagues from even large independent member states shows that all of them see the advantages of a joint approach. They are going to open their embassies in those foreign countries with which relations are of priority to them. In the other cases they prefer to be represented by Russia's ambassadors.

The typist who shook the world

G.S. Probably it is not only a matter of embassies. As far as I know, Russia intends to join NATO, while the Ukraine stands for neutrality. At the same time we are talking about a common military strategic space and a unitary strategic forces command. How to combine the independence of the

Commonwealth member states in their foreign affairs with their interdependence?

A.K. You've hit the nail on the head. Indeed, there is no exhaustive answer to the question of what the Commonwealth is and how it is going to operate. I think we will have to proceed from a combination of unity and plurality. It's not ruled out that the Commonwealth will be a transitional stage towards fully independent states. In this case I don't see any other way than gradually "transplanting" the armed forces on Russian soil. It stands to reason, after all. However, for the present the question arises — what civil institutions will exercise control over the armed forces of the Commonwealth? Which parliament or how many parliaments will make decisions concerning military expenses? For the moment, the answer may be either four or at twelve. But who will determine the amount of each share? There is a danger of the military becoming a state within a state, as happened in the Soviet Union, only now this will be easier, because of there being a number of parliaments. I would like the Russian part of the military budget — and Russia accounts for the lion's share of the armed forces — to go through a long procedure of scrutiny, as is the case in the United States and other developed countries. This is the only practical way to ensure reasonable sufficiency for which military science criteria do not exist at present. Civil society decides for itself what is reasonable and sufficient, proceeding from the set of external threats, considerations of prestige and social situation, by means of its institutions, and primarily the parliament. This problem is essential not only from the viewpoint of guarantees of control over nuclear weapons; its solution is a prerequisite for the integration of the army into civil society.

G.S. Does this mean that the armed forces of the Commonwealth are a myth?

A.K. We are working out a variant which envisages an extremely complicated system of control over the army on the part of the member states, as well as a no less diversified contribution they are expected to make to the armed forces.

G.S. The control, it seems, could become so complicated that it could, in fact, cease to be effective?

A.K. There is such a danger. For the time being there are more questions than answers. However, guarantees of stability in the armed forces are of vital importance today. You have probably noticed that the surrounding world doesn't even discuss the problem of whether or not we need the enormous arsenal of a nuclear superpower. All are concerned about the problem of preserving the stability of and unitary control over this arsenal. The easiest thing to do here is to divide the army and declare the part deployed on the territory of a particular state its property.

G.S. This is what the Ukraine is doing...

A.K. I wouldn't like to criticize anyone. I proceed from the assumption that we are all sensible people. However, it is of principal importance that the natural right to possessing one's own armed forces be correlated with the reality in which we all exist. This reality is such that placing the army stationed on the territories of the independent states before the option — to whom to swear allegiance and whom to obey — means running the risk of a split and destabilization. If in the same military unit there are officers and men obeying different states, any personal confrontation may acquire political implications. And political conflicts between the member states of the Commonwealth are not, unfortunately, ruled out. I favour the concept of excluding the army from political life.

If we managed to reach an agreement about a three- or four-year transitional period, this time would be quite sufficient to settle in a civilized manner all problems with those republics who would like to have their own armed forces, as well as with those which prefer a united army. And those who will choose the path of a closer cooperation might join NATO together with Russia. By the way, a few words about NATO. We in fact compiled a report for President Yeltsin in which it was stated that Russia did not at the moment raise the question of joining NATO; the idea was that the matter was to be considered in the future. But the word "not" disappeared when the paper was copied by a typist...

G.S. And how could it have happened that the typing error was noticed only three days later?

A.K. Well, we were already in Rome at the moment and marvelled at everybody talking about NATO. I was asked there if we really raised the question of joining it. I answered we did, but it was planned for some time in the future. Probably it is not even so bad that the typist brought the problem to a head. All of us had to consider it seriously. I see no tragedy in that some of the Commonwealth member states will pursue independent military policies in the future.

G.S. Which means in fact that there will be no common military space either?

A.K. I wish there were. Unfortunately, not all wishes come true. However, you needn't dramatize the situation. The most important thing today is to cope with destabilization, and tomorrow new pos-

sibilities may arise. Look at the West. Various countries participate in various coordination mechanisms. The European Community does not coincide with NATO. Within the EC, there is the Western European Union, whose composition is different from both the EC and NATO. Most probably we also will have a kind of mosaic — some will join the military union, others — the economic; some will stay away from either, just preserving good relations with both. Would you like to hear a forecast? Bilateral agreements will acquire growing importance alongside multilateral ones. This won't be a disintegration of the Commonwealth, but rather a supplement to it. If we settle the most complicated problems, including military and economic ones, on the basis of the bilateral agreement we have already concluded with the Ukraine, this will only consolidate the ground for multilateral cooperation.

...and no bathrooms, please!

G.S. There are at least three new nuclear states in the mosaic we have presented to the world...

A.K. Not quite so, because here too the concept of a successor — this time to a nuclear superpower — works. Incidentally, I think that Russia will have to be a nuclear power — I hope, not a superpower. It is

stated in the Minsk Agreement that the decision concerning the use or, rather, non-use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation. He acts in coordination with the member states of the Commonwealth on whose territory they are deployed and taking into account the interests of the other members of the Commonwealth. In other words, it is the strategic space of not only four, but of all the states.

G.S. All the more so that there are tactical nuclear arms on the territory of almost all of them...

A.K. We intend to remove and destroy tactical arms quickly, as stipulated by the agreements reached.

G.S. Nevertheless it is difficult to imagine how the question of the nuclear button can be coordinated if the situation requires a quick decision. Suppose one of the four is taking a bath, somebody is taking a rest and is nowhere to be found...

A.K. And this pertains to the responsibility of the leader of the state or country on whose territory nuclear weapons are deployed — once the responsibility is assumed, there can be

no question of bathrooms or banquet halls inaccessible for immediate communication. Today President Yeltsin is followed by several large cars stuffed with electronic equipment affording him communication through the hotline at any point in his itinerary.

G.S. There is also the Kazakh component in our nuclear mosaic. The Ukraine has declared its desire to get rid of its nuclear burden, while Kazakhstan, in all evidence, is not in a hurry to abandon it...

A.K. You'd better ask President Nazarbayev about it. But as I understand it, the only difference is in the timetable. The Ukraine insists on urgent liquidation, while Kazakhstan doesn't.

G.S. Are you going to resort mainly to traditional negotiations or to unilateral steps already taken first by President Bush last autumn and later by Gorbachev?

A.K. It will be more expedient probably to combine the method of negotiations with unilateral steps. Formerly the main method was that of excruciating negotiations while unilateral initiatives were resorted to either in order to expedite something or to place the partner in an unfavourable light. It's high time we acted on the basis of reasonable sufficiency — if we have found a surplus of weapons they must be reduced without any negotiations. In this case the other side may also react adequately and find something to re-



Drawing by Arkady Gursky

duce too. Negotiations could play an auxiliary role here.

G.S. How are you going to divide the Geneva and Vienna disarmament talks between the members of the Commonwealth?

A.K. The scheme is still to be worked out. We are discussing the matter with our colleagues just now. It stands to reason that a joint delegation with a coordinated position must be sent to the negotiations on nuclear weapons which remain under joint command. It is not ruled out that the members of the Commonwealth will participate independently in the talks on conventional arms in Geneva. After all, the NATO members are individually responsible for their quotas of reductions and the steps they agree upon.

In the common anti-economic space

G.S. With whom is it easier for you to conduct negotiations — with your partners in the Commonwealth or with your foreign colleagues?

A.K. With the foreign colleagues, of course. I don't make a secret of it. The democratic countries of the West, into which I include a large group of states ranging from Japan to the United States, are our natural friends. The structure of relations with them has been worked out and settled. We know what we are talking about. Everything is all right on their part; we have no problem with understanding their complicated but orderly position. The Commonwealth member states are also our natural friends, but, like Russia, they are living through a transitional period too. I have apprehensions about both the attempts to measure everything with one common yardstick and the categorical nature of certain demands.

G.S. What is the mechanism for decision-making in the sphere of Russian foreign policy?

A.K. This is a sore point. There is no worked-out scheme. We are now busy working on it together with all bodies concerned — the military, with what is left of the KGB, and with foreign trade organizations. The last instance is the President. The legislators could assume control over the military and foreign policy budgets. I realize that it is going to be a bad headache for me. Yet this is the key allowing the parliament to control us without interfering in routine decision-making. Besides, the Supreme Soviet has the instrument of ratification for influencing policy.

G.S. Do you enjoy freedom of decision-making?

A.K. Yes, we have freedom of routine decision-making. However, all decisions of a political nature must be settled with the President.

G.S. Would you like to have more freedom?

A.K. I would like contacts with the President and the parliament concerning the decision-making being institutionalized. There must be two constantly operating channels of communication, it would facilitate my work — not because I shun responsibility. I just want to have constant feed-back to feel that I am controlled...

G.S. And, lastly, the most important question: what, in your opinion, are the priorities of Russia's foreign policy?

A.K. I am criticized for lacking a clear concept of Russia's foreign policy. We work on it together with scientists and experts. But I must confess that it is a futile undertaking — just like a CPSU programme: if it overlooks something, it is incomplete; when complete it becomes a dead scheme. For instance, there exists the notion of the US national interests. But where are they recorded? They are each time defined according to the situation. I see Russia's national interest in preventing the emergence of impenetrable borders for millions of Russians live in the states outside Russia, and in preventing severance of normal economic relations in the course of gratifying the natural tendencies towards sovereignization, although we live not in a common economic, but rather in a common anti-economic space. Some discontinuance of economic ties is inevitable just as bankruptcy of some enterprises in Russia. However, it is vitally important to prevent trade wars. One more vitally important interest lies in going beyond the end of the "cold war" (which is Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's merit) towards cooperation in building democratic societies and a normal life in one sixth of the world. Our former opponents become our natural allies. Our aim is to enter the community of civilized nations of the Northern Hemisphere. One more area of our interests lies in cooperation with all our other neighbours along the southern border, considering their unique characteristics. We are also seriously interested in developing economic relations with our indirect neighbours, such as the countries of the ASEAN or Brazil. And lastly, Russia's participation in the Security Council in conformity with the concept of the successor to the Soviet Union. This is a great responsibility. I don't rule out that in the course of time we will participate in peace-keeping forces. We may also have to consider some time the possibility of using the United Nations' units in conflicts on the territory of the Commonwealth.

The President of Russia has been invited to Tokyo. But should he go there? The visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan last year was useful mainly for himself. Had he visited Japan several years earlier he would have probably had to seriously consider the need for solving the territorial problem that divides the two countries. Boris Yeltsin has already been to Japan, but in a more convenient role as the opposition leader. He offered an intricate five-stage plan of settling the relations. It was believed that at least two islands of the South Kuril range would have to be returned to Japan. President Yeltsin can now put his plan into effect. But does he want to do that?...

The discussion on the fate of the Kuril islands to which Japan lays territorial claims has long since exceeded the academic bounds. Both politicians in the Far East and in Moscow have joined in a campaign against the return of these islands. Even readers' letters to *New Times* show that any talk of giving the islands back to Japan since the Soviet government promised returning two of them back in 1956, give rise to charges of "selling out the homeland."

Valentin Fyodorov, the governor of Sakhalin, has built up a considerable political stake in this struggle, vowing to die rather than return the islands. However, for some reason Tokyo does not believe in the governor's principled stand. Discussing Fyodorov's vehement statements, politicians and businessmen use the expression which can be translated as "bidding up."

Japanese companies anxious to develop the oil and gas deposits on the Sakhalin shelf complain that, as a preliminary conditions, the local authorities demand the investment of roughly 15 billion dollars in the economy and infrastructure of the island. This is six times the amount of financial aid which Tokyo decided to give the former Soviet Union last year.

In violation of Russian legislation, the Fyodorov team contends that the natural resources of Sakhalin and its shelf belong only to the island population, not the whole state. In the opinion of the Fyodorov team, the vast oil and gas deposits discovered as a result of long prospecting should enrich Sakhalin. They are against using these deposits as a source of power supply and hard currency for the entire Far Eastern part of Russia.

Since last summer foreign companies have been vying for the right to take part in the exploitation of these deposits. Russian governmental departments and oil experts give preference to large companies which have the necessary experience and technology. The Sakhalin authorities demand that the right to exploit the resources should be given to small companies which promise to supply food and clothes to the island and invest money in its infrastructure.

A hard nut to crack

Boris Yeltsin has a hard choice to make – to give the islands back to Japan or not

Tokyo believes that the Sakhalin governor simply does not want to be pushed aside when Moscow begins to distribute the Japanese billions in the form of aid and credits. If this is so Valentin Fyodorov has chosen the right tactics. Tokyo is indeed discussing the possibility of giving direct aid to the population of Sakhalin and the Kuril islands.

Boris Yeltsin is in a worse position than the governor. Valentin Fyodorov will stand to gain in any case. If the islands remain Russian, he will gain a reputation as a patriot who defended the Russian land from encroachments by a foreign state. If the islands are turned over to Japan, Sakhalin will be offered many credits as well.

What can Yeltsin do? In Russia's present situation none of its citizens will feel bitter if the President leaves the decision of the territorial dispute to our future generations. The Yeltsin team is hardly anxious to give the nationalists one more occasion for attacks on the President because of some islands.

However, the President, who promised to free the country from the great-power legacy, should perhaps also free new Russia from the disgraceful legacy of its previous foreign policy.

The discussion in the foreign ministry of Russia lasted for several days. Russia is assuming the commitments and debts of the Soviet Union. But should it take all commitments? Shouldn't it immediately break off the disgraceful allied relations it has with North Korea or Iraq? How to treat the declaration of 1956 under which Moscow pledged to return the Shikotan and Habomai islands to Japan?

Moscow can renounce the declaration and thus deprive the Japanese diplomats of their most solid argument which is, "have promised but have not given back." The consequences of this step are evident. It will undermine confidence in the entire foreign policy of Russia. Of course, the Russian politicians, who explain to the people why the islands cannot be returned, do not want even to hear about the consequen-

ences. Career diplomats know, however, that Stalin tore these islands away from Japan in August 1945. But what can they do with this knowledge?

Many palliative proposals have been made recently. A "third way" and a "fourth way" have been advanced. Some believe that a free economic zone should be set up on the Kuril islands. They would agree to anything but giving the islands back to Japan. Arguments about the historical ownership of the islands and their military significance have given way to concern about the fate of the citizens of the "northern territories." Should they be driven out and deported? When Tokyo suggested allowing all those who wish to acquire Japanese citizenship or the right to permanent residence, or paying the expenses needed for resettlement, the sentiments on the islands changed. A new argument has appeared: the future generations will not forgive the transfer of the islands and will damn the present politicians as they damn the tsarist government for the selling of Alaska to America.

"The sellout of Russia must not be allowed." The moral aspect of this argument seems invulnerable. But is seizing territory from another country and continuing to hold it moral? If the Russian government intends to devise a formula for avoiding the answer to this question it is better not to go to Japan at all.

Leonid Mlechin

SOCIOLOGICAL POLL

Prof. Boris Grushin's Vox Populi Poll

"Russia must not squander its territories"

Some believe that the four Kuril islands annexed by the USSR after the defeat of Japan in 1945 must be given back. They refer to the standards of international law, the need for reconciliation and cooperation with Japan and the possibility of receiving financial aid from it.



Others categorically object, asserting that Russia must not squander its territories, that the transfer will lead to a new flow of refugees from the islands. Considering all the pros and cons: "SHOULD THE ISLANDS BE RETURNED TO JAPAN OR NOT?" The figures are given in percent of

the total number of respondents.

The youngest (27 percent) and most educated (22 percent) respondents advocate the idea of returning Kuril islands to Japan. People with incomplete secondary education (80 percent) and at the age of 60 and over (75 percent) spoke out against this action.

The breakdown of negative answers by regions of the Russian Federation (see the diagram):

1 – the Far East, 2 – the Volga-Vyatka regio, 3 – Western Siberia, 4 – the central European part of Russia, 5 – the north-western regions, 6 and 7 respectively – the Volga-side area and the Urals, 8 – the North Caucasus, 9 – Eastern Siberia, 10 – the central black-earth zone, and 11 – Moscow.



The all-Russian poll was held at the end of 1991, and 2,000 people were asked to give their responses.

George Bush and rivals

The struggle for the president's seat in the White House will begin on February 18 with the New Hampshire primaries. It was only three or four months ago that the presidential campaign seemed nothing more than a pleasure trip for Bush, while his Democratic rivals seemed doomed to the role of political kamikazes. Today most US political analysts continue to give preference to George Bush, but they stress that, first, the president will have a tough time trying to win the race and, secondly, that Bush's will not be a solid victory, but a squeeze-in to the White House. Bush's popularity ratings have plummeted from the unprecedented 90 percent after the Gulf victory to less than 50 percent.

The situation is somewhat similar to the past two decades' least predictable election campaign when President Gerald Ford (R) competed with the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. In 1976 the result of the elections was not known until the night after the election day. After many months of hard campaigning and numerous attempts to predict the outcome, the fate of the presidency was solved by 300,000 voters from New York who were angry with Ford for the latter's refusal to use federal assistance to help their city out of the financial morass.

After twelve years out of the White House, the Democrats are thirsty for power and they are pinning much hope on the prospect that the 1976 situation may repeat itself.

A gloomy view

The drastic change in the political landscape of America has come about unnoticeably, even insidiously, without any political or private scandals which usually precede such changes.

The Bush administration's optimism was somewhat clouded by the economic recession that started a year and a half ago. Initially, the recession was natural and even useful, because it followed an eight-year period of growth. The economy which got overloaded in the 1980's needed a break, because of the widely-used practice of living on credit which threatened to bring about a new inflationary upsurge.

The White House assumed the wait-and-see tactics suggested by head of the White House staff John Sununu and his followers whose economic policies have long been guided by a Hippocratic principle: above all, do not harm. This tactic was quite reasonable, because in the conditions of a tremendous budget deficit, the

White House had almost no levers of effective influence on the economy.

Politics is a capricious thing, however. Sometimes, it refuses to be guided by common sense and economically expedient considerations.

A modest tendency towards economic growth appeared last July-August and it seemed that the administration's economic policy had justified itself. However, the spectre of a new recession started looming in October again. The White House, however, remained hopeful for the economy's speedy pullout from stagnation. The bolt from the blue came when the political lightweight Democrat Harris Wofford laid waste to the Republican celebrity, Richard Thornburg at the Pennsylvania primaries. The former Justice Secretary seeking a seat on the Senate, Thornburg seemed to be an embodiment of the respectable policies of the White House. In September his popularity rating was two or three times as high as Wofford's — the more painful was the blow to the administration.

The awakening was so hard, that on the day after the Pennsylvania elections, George Bush called an urgent early-morning press conference several hours before he was due to leave for the NATO summit in Rome, and talked about his commitment to a sound economy and the well-being of the average American.

The populist election platform of Wofford can't be described as a programme offering vistas of breath-taking prosperity. Wofford machine-gunned Washington's economic policies, while offering very little in the way of replacement. What mattered more, though, was that the voters liked his programme, and regarded it as more reasonable than the administration's promises of prosperity around the corner. Moreover, the Wofford programme included one very undemocratic feature: since Roosevelt's times the Democrats have stressed the necessity of social programmes to help the needy, but Wofford's slogan was the protection of the middle class from high taxes and economic difficulties.

This move had a great influence on the voters because the middle class makes up about 65 percent of American society and it is on the middle class that outcomes of any election finally depend. In the past the republican candidates, including Reagan and Bush, were quite successful in appealing to the middle class, blaming the Democrats for squandering money on social programmes. Today Wofford and other Democrats seem to be ready to change places with the Republicans. The more so as the

Too many candidates and too vague their prospects




Diagram and photo from the Time magazine (USA)

American middle class has been pessimistic and depressed the past few months. No one wants to say good-bye to one's house and familiar lifestyle. No one wants to live tomorrow worse than one used to live yesterday. However, this prospect is starting to seem more and more realistic to a great many Americans.

Jobs are the main problem. People are afraid of the looming long period of job reductions in industry and services. Although in the 1980s the United States managed to mend the situation of their lagging behind the Japanese and Europeans as far as labour productivity was concerned, the American rivals overseas were not idle either and European and Japanese companies continue to beat American ones on America's home market. Besides, the campaign for greater productivity has resulted in job cuts and slower wage growth rates.

In this situation the Olympian calm of the White House and the administration's economic policies became prime targets for the accusation of being indifferent to the needs of the ordinary American and of lacking leadership.

The Democrats revive

Six Democratic candidates have joined the presidential campaign. Initially, this sparsity reflected the small chance for victory and the lack of strong candidates. Even the commonly accepted Democratic leader, New York Governor Mario

Cuomo had a lot of doubts whether to risk a competition with the seemingly invincible Bush. When the situation changed, these doubts and the necessity to finalize the state budget made Cuomo declare that he would not run for presidency. For the rest of the candidates, however, the surprises of October and November were a godsend. Today the two leading Democratic candidates are Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and Bob Kerrey, Senator from Nebraska.

Clinton has more money and a more detailed programme. He is the only Southerner out of the six candidates, which helps him increase his chances in the South and consolidate a traditional Democratic alliance between producers of the North-West and the South. The governor advocates a new agreement that could restore the broken links between the people and the government. According to the recent opinion polls Bill Clinton together with former Senator Paul Tsongas have greater overstripped other candidates on the eve of the New Hampshire primaries.

Bob Kerrey is an invalid and a Vietnam war hero fawned over by women. He has a good programme of national health insurance, which is now one of America's hottest problems. The exorbitant price of treatment exceeds the insurance premium making health care too expensive even for some of the middle class.

Over thirty million Americans do not have the health insurance. The United States spends twice as much as Britain on

health care, but experts agree that the British health care system is superior.

Some chances are still left for the custodian of New Deal values Senator Tom Harkin (Iowa). His favorite theme — a programme of public works. The senator is a good speaker and is widely supported by the trade unions.

Despite the variety of presidential candidates, their programmes boil down to appeals to the middle class and calls for a revision of the philosophy of the Reagan Revolution. Attempts to revise this philosophy have been made before as well, but they were not successful, because the Americans associated them with inflated social programmes. Today Democrats stress that the conservatives' hopes on "the invisible hand of the market" will result in further job cuts, and loss of American status on the international market. Referring to the example of Japan and Germany, the Democrats argue for a greater role by the state in providing for economic growth.

This year the popularity contest of Democrats will not be long. It is generally expected that one Democratic candidate will be selected at the beginning of April, while the National Convention of the Democratic Party will take place in New York in July.

The situation is clearer in the Republican camp: few people doubt that George Bush will be nominated for presidency at the August R.Convention in Houston. However, an opposition on the right wing is threatening the president with serious trouble. A conservative journalist and

demagogue, Patrick Buchanan has nominated himself already. His main slogan is "America First." Despite the obvious absurdity in attempts to isolate the country from the rest of the world and in attempting to erect protectionist barriers, Buchanan is playing to win. If he wins even ten percent of votes from the New Hampshire voters, it will be a hard blow to Bush. Buchanan has ensured himself the support of the state's leading conservative newspaper. His appeals to the primitive instincts of the people of New Hampshire who have experienced a sinking feeling during their fall from almost complete prosperity to a serious crisis, may prove quite effective.

As a more remote prospect, as Republicans and Democrats are competing to win, a third force may step in — the former Ku Klux Klan member and Nazi sympathizer David Duke, who has gathered a significant number of votes at the recent elections in Louisiana but not enough to be elected state governor.

The White House has treated very seriously the unpleasant surprises of the past few months. The president jumped on the situation immediately. He fired John Sununu whose arrogance and authoritarian ways irritated even his followers in the right-wing factions of the Republican Party (speaking to me some American journalists openly described Sununu as a fascist). The new head of the White House staff, the energetic and tactful Samuel Skinner, has radically changed the administration's policies. Now George Bush never tires of repeating that the main issue for America is jobs.

The Administration is preparing suggestions for a specific kind of reduction in taxes for the middle class and using Pentagon funds for social programmes. These suggestions are presented as measures to galvanize a stagnant economy. Everybody understands that the situation cannot be saved by an injection of several billions or even a hundred of billions. It is also obvious that sitting on one's hands is no better. The administration is mostly counting on the psychological effect produced by this show of concern about the fate of common Americans.

It seems nonetheless that even in the context of the current difficulties Americans are in a better mood than they were in the 1970s when they voted down Ford and Carter. I remember the atmosphere of total pessimism that was felt then. People were depressed not only by unemployment, but also by high prices, long lines for gasoline and doomsday visions of the Soviet empire laying waste to America. Today the sentiments are better. Besides, most experts agree that the economy will soon start getting away from the decline and that even its very modest growth will be enough to ensure George Bush's victory.

Helping the Americans

There is one tendency in America's postwar history: foreign politics was the centrepiece of an election campaign only twice — in 1948 when the Cold War began and in 1960 during the war in Vietnam. In all other campaigns, including the current one, an opposite tactic was observed. The current campaign is no exception. As soon as the land started slipping from under the president's feet, his opponents ranging from left-wing Democrats to right-wing Republicans attacked Bush accusing him of paying too much attention to foreign affairs at the expense of domestic problems. For some time Bush's leadership during the international coalition's victory over Saddam Hussein and the relatively peaceful break-up of the Soviet empire, intensely feared by many Americans, was forgotten.

The President had to postpone his visit to Japan and other Asian and Pacific countries and when the visit finally took place the President's main concern was more jobs for Americans.

The talk about aiding Russia and other newly-sovereign countries is rigidly opposed: "We must help ourselves first. There are too many homeless here as it is..." Taking these sentiments into account, the Congress has rejected the suggestion that a billion dollars be taken away from the Pentagon budget to be spent on humanitarian and other assistance to the former USSR. It was with much difficulty that the administra-

tion convinced the Congress to keep \$400 million intended for the elimination and safe storage of nuclear weapons.

Personally, I believe that the refusal to help under the pretext of the necessity "to help oneself first" is pure demagoguery. The issue is not even that thousands of billions had been spent on the Cold War while the assistance to the former USSR is only \$3 billion a year (including the assistance of other countries and international organizations). The budget of the US Department of Health Care and Social Security has amounted to \$525 billion, but the number of homeless has not been reduced. On the other hand, however, Western credits could help keep Russia, the Ukraine and other Commonwealth nations afloat during the hard time of transition to market economy.

In the past few days, though, a more reasonable approach to foreign affairs has started to be demonstrated by the presidential candidates. The Democrats are starting to speak that the end of the Cold War creates a unique opportunity to radically revise the foreign affairs objectives of the United States. Governor Clinton declared, for example, that in today's world foreign and domestic policy are inseparable, and national security is largely economic. Almost all Democratic candidates have spoken up for rendering various forms of assistance to the Commonwealth — mostly under the slogan of establishing new markets for America. Bush is even being criticized for having been insufficiently active in this process. The White House is now pinning hopes on the proposed international conference devoted to economic assistance to the former Soviet Union.

The presidential campaign will see many dramatic turns and changes in tactics, including the position vis-à-vis Russia and other Commonwealth states. In this respect, the presidential campaign in the remote US may have a direct effect on the life of people in the newly-independent states of the Commonwealth.

Yevgeny Rusakov,
our own correspondent
NEW YORK

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THIRD BASKET

NT INVESTIGATION

British POWs in Moscow's Butyrka prison

Lev Yelin

Historians believe there were 15 of them. In any case, 15 secret files were started in the British Defence Ministry and then 15 honorable awards were granted for "courage in the battle field" without the usual description of the feats. They were also ordered then to forget about what had happened to them...

Only one of the 15 is still alive. He is Robert (Tony) Bainbridge, 72 years old. In the files of the NKVD's Department for POWs and Internees he is mentioned as Corporal Bainbridge, Robert Williamovich. Bainbridge's story about his ordeals, the reminiscences of those who went through the "Russian inferno" together with him, the recollections of members of their families, the declassified army archives of Britain, and the NKVD documents allow us to reconstruct the events of 1940 and 1941.

"It's foolish to flee to Russia"

In the first months of the second World War all 15 were taken prisoner by German troops. Some could not break out of encirclement and others captured wounded. The company of Robert Bainbridge were taken in pincers by a German tank group in France, near Arras, in May 1940. Later, they were sent to camps in Poland — in Torrun (STALAG XXA), where hundreds of British POWs were already kept.

Bainbridge recalls that conditions in the camps were terrible. The place was full of lice and cockroaches.

True, inmates soon began to receive parcels through the Red Cross and their families learned what had happened to them. Nevertheless, captivity was intolerable for the 15. They fled from the camp, hoping to reach the neighbouring neutral Russia. It seemed the only real chance for them... On September 21, 1940 Tony Bainbridge, Joseph Waller (b. 1918) and William Roberts (b. 1907) broke a window and were able to mislead the German guards. Shortly after that they were spotted by policemen. But the British again managed to escape. Poles gave them civilian clothes and helped them cross the Vistula River and establish contact with the underground...

They learned two phrases in Russian and fled from Nazi captivity to the Soviet Union in 1941, believing they would be free there...

Almost all runaways were given shelter by Polish anti-fascists and received money and clothes from them. They moved from one secret address to another until they were brought to the Soviet frontier. True, the Poles did not understand the persistent desire of the British fugitives to get into Russia. James Allan writes in his memoirs, published in a small edition only in 1955, that the Poles tried to dissuade him from going to Russia, saying: "It's foolish to flee there." They made him learn in Russian two phrases "I'm an Englishman. Don't shoot."

The British were convinced there was only one step from the Soviet frontier to the British Embassy in Moscow. The Russians are not like Germans, they thought, and must treat British subjects with respect.

Early in October 1940, at night, James Allan swam across the Bug River and pronounced the



Hubert Lovegrove is being presented with an award in 1942... They were asked to forget about their ordeals

When we saw the border guards, I and Barnes began to explain that we were Englishmen and handed them a letter written by Poles in Russian. "We were separated and a soldier stood behind each of us, George Briggs would tell later investigators from the British Defence Ministry. I heard how the sol-

This took place on September 9. Shortly afterwards a message was sent from the Moscow British Embassy to London. It said that, according to the information received from Molotov, Sergeant-Major Maurice Barnes was wounded during an illegal crossing of the border and died on the way to a hospital.

The British were transferred from one prison to another while the NKVD bosses

By that time more than 15,000 Poles had been shot near Kalinin. Kharkov and Smolensk. But executions continued. Robert Bainbridge, who was in the same cell with William Roberts, described the death of one of his Smolensk acquaintances.

"It was a Polish colonel," he said. "One morning he was summoned for interrogation. Before leaving, the colonel told us that he would throw his handkerchief into our cell if he were sentenced to be shot... Some time later we saw a handkerchief falling down. We fell to our knees and began to pray..."

Bainbridge was struck when he saw an expectant mother among Russian inmates. This did not surprise Russians and Poles. In Smolensk, he recalls, one of the guards brought children to look at an Englishman. "I felt annoyed," Bainbridge said, "because I grew terribly thin and was in rags..."

...Robert Bainbridge agreed to talk with me mostly because I was introduced to him by Lord Nicholas Bethell, a man well known in Britain. The 15 Englishmen did not have warm feelings for Russia.

"My father despised Russians till the last days of his life," I was told by a daughter of Hubert Lovegrove (b. 1907).

By the New Year five Englishmen — Allan, Lovegrove, Briggs, Kenneth Batesman and Edward Boughton found themselves in cell 97 of Moscow's Butyrka prison. Together with them were seven Frenchmen, who also fled from the Nazis. The Englishmen recalled that some of the French inmates were Communists, and this created tension in the cell. Poles were kept in cell 94, Finns in cell 95, and Czechs in cell 96. It seems that Japanese prisoners were in cell 99, Allan wrote in his memoirs.

They were regularly interrogated.

"There is proof that you are a spy, that you have been smuggled by Scotland Yard," the interrogator told James Allan. "What were your instructions?"

For some reason the interrogators wanted very much to know whether Britain had secret police. They also wanted to know everything about the Polish underground. But the Englishmen kept silent.

The list, according to which the English soldiers were turned over to embassy officials. One can see 14 ticks and the signature of a British diplomat

Sometimes interrogations lasted for several hours. James Allan seemed particularly suspicious to the NKVD. The problem was that in Poland and later in Soviet prisons he learned several Russian phrases to make himself understood. Allan was taken for interrogations to the Lubyanka prison.

The interrogators demanded that he reply in Russian. He lost his five teeth when they beat him with a rubber club, and his leg, wounded in France, was injured.

"They beat me, threw me onto the stone floor and kept saying 'He understands Russian,'" James Allan recalls. "I realized only later what they expected of me. They wanted me to cry for mercy in Russian and thus betray myself as a spy..."

The "dossier" of Allan, which he saw on the interrogator's desk, grew thicker. Finally, he was taken to a well-furnished luxurious room. The NKVD's big shot threatened that if Allan did not make a clean breast of his deeds he would be exiled to Siberia forever and would never see his wife... He was offered a sheet of paper to sign. The text printed above was covered by a metal plate.

It seemed to Allan that he was going mad. He went hysterical during the interrogation and thought of committing suicide...

Executions in Butyrka prison


The British inmates wrote letters to the Embassy, but none of them were received by it.

"We understood that the Embassy was nearby in Moscow but it could equally have been in Australia, because in any case our shouting could not be heard," Allan recalls.

However, after a ten-day hunger strike (Allan, who was thought to be the organizer, spent five days of the strike in a punishment cell) Bateman, Boughton, Briggs and Lovegrove were transferred from the Butyrka prison to the Kozelsk camp of the NKVD. As a result, 14 Englishmen stayed in that camp until June 1941. Robert Brainbridge was brought to it earlier, right from the Minsk prison. Several dozen Frenchmen were also kept there.

The 15th, the most "suspicious" Englishman, James Allan, was moved to a new cell of the Butyrka prison, where he was kept with victims of the Stalin repressions. He remembered the names of some of them, probably with mistakes.

Abramov, an airman who evidently had held a high position because he talked even with guards in a peremptory tone. Allan was told that Abramov was put in prison because of Ribbentrop. He was the commander of an airfield on the territory seized from Poland. In 1939 German



Tony Bainbridge
in 1940
and now

the NKVD black car. He expected a shot till the last second, because he could be killed during "an escape attempt..."

Turned over to the Embassy

Former British inmates recall that conditions in the Kozelsk camp were tolerable. They were allowed to write letters home and were fed better than in the Minsk and Smolensk prisons. Reports by Senior Lieutenant of State Security Korolev, the chief of the Kozelsk camp, have been preserved in the NKVD archives. Here is one of them.

"Political talks on the following themes have been conducted among the inmates: 1. Anglo-German war; 2. Anglo-French relations... Five films have been shown to them — *La Marseillaise*, *Concert on the Screen*, *The Bright Pass*, *Kubanians*, *The Valiant Seven*... The main difficulty is getting the idea home to them because they do not know Russian. During the day time inmates play volleyball, basketball and other games played at liberty. Flowerbeds have been planted. A portrait of Comrade STALIN has been hung in the Lenin room. The absence of such a portrait was due to the fact that we could not get one, not only in the camp but even in Kozelsk shops. Therefore we had to buy portraits of Comrade STALIN in Moscow."

The camp administration spent 40 rubles 10 kopecks to buy the writings of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Marx, as well as *Gobseck* by Balzac and Moliere's comedy *Miser* in French and English, and for the subscription to the newspaper *Moscow News* (three copies).

planes, one of them carrying Ribbentrop, flew over that airfield. Abramov had not been warned and he ordered his men to fire at them. The Germans urgently had to land on an injured plane. Ribbentrop flew into a rage...



Among other inmates of the cell were also **Selivanov**, a Leningrad producer; **Kilparisov**, a splendid chess-player; **Mayorov**, a noted sportsman; **Mahomet Robadanov** from the city of Samarkand, who killed an NKVD man, because the latter trumped up a charge in order to throw Robadanov into prison and take his wife away from him.

Inmates were shot three or four times a week at night in the wash-room opposite Allan's cell. One morning Allan saw dead bodies. Their faces were covered with blood. The warders evidently did not have time to remove the bodies. Abramov gave the guards a dressing down...

Some time later Allan was transferred to a Saratov prison. On the way to Saratov he was wounded by a bayonet. But soon he was returned to the Lubyanka prison in Moscow.

On October 1941 James Allan was put in a car and dropped off not far from the British Embassy.

He ran towards the building on which he saw the Union Jack. Allan nearly fell in his prison shoes without laces, looking back at



James Allan could describe his ordeals in the Butyrka prison only ten years after the war

True, till June 22, 1941 the inmates of the Kozelsk camp were not sure about their fate. They did not know with what state Russia would ally. One of the NKVD officers personally broke up every day the Union Jack laid by Englishmen with stones in the garden.

Late in June and early July, 14 Englishmen were brought to an NKVD countryhouse near Moscow where they had a nourishing meal. "They wanted us to look healthy when we were turned over to the Embassy," said Bainbridge, who could not eat normally for several months after his return to Britain.

The Englishmen refused to eat, and NKVD men even tried to feed them forcibly...

I wrote about Pyotr Soprunenko; chief of the NKVD Department for POWs and Internees, who still lives in Moscow and who signed documents which decided the fate of thousands of Polish prisoners as well as Finns, Englishmen and Frenchmen (see *NT* issues 17 and 42/1991). So this man received a paper signed by Major-General Apollonov. It said:

"By order of Comrade VYSHINSKY the 14 British soldiers who escaped

from German captivity must be turned over to the British Embassy.

Comrade Gusev, head of the Second Western Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, has been assigned to get an agreement on the procedure and place for the transfer of these soldiers to the Embassy."

The British soldiers were brought to the Rossiya Hotel and on July 9 two colonels from the British Army came to take them back.

They returned home, received decorations and were ordered to keep silent about their misfortunes in Russia. London did not want to spoil relations with Stalin.

* * *

...Probably, this is not the whole story about the British soldiers who escaped from Nazi captivity and got into the hands of the NKVD. Were all of them turned over to London? James Allan recalls that on the wall of the Minsk prison he saw an inscription in English "Captain Richardson." This man was not on the NKVD list handed to the Embassy on July 9, 1941. Did he share the fate of Maurice Barnes in being killed where he had sought out shelter? Alas, we can only guess...

LONDON-MOSCOW

**The editors
thank historian
Vladimir Galitsky
for the archival
documents supplied
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Unemployment and job hunting

Curiously enough, wherever you go you see that most employees are young folk. There are very few middle-aged and no elderly folk at all among them, even although the retirement age is 65.

Without analyzing this phenomenon in depth let me note that after a certain age is reached people crave to start their own businesses. They either set up their own firms, or join operating firms as partners.

Many future entrepreneurs deliberately start a career: working for somebody else. By learning the ins and outs of another man's business and noting his pluses and minuses, they accumulate know-how, put aside enough money, and establish a modicum of business connections. After that they are ready to start their own enterprises.

Another motivation is the fear of becoming unemployed. At any enterprise it is always the case for less employees with seniority, that is executives, to be needed than ordinary energetic, young, fit performers. What I mean is that if an employee has been working some ten years or so and has not developed into a knowledgeable executive, he will not be able to compete with younger employees, and will get the boot sooner or later.

Of course, there are exceptions, such as the so-called "irreplaceable" employees, whose situation does not depend on the pecking order. However, not infrequently one who has been working for years and, who has not been able to start his own business, begins to lose his self-respect, which means his boss also loses respect for him, which is enough for him to be given the golden handshake.

Yet no status, however exceptional, can ensure steady employment. A firm or company may go bankrupt, cease operat-

ing or be sold and have its functions change. In short, the loss of job is a most tangible possibility for many Americans.

A proportion of jobless is a definite capitalist statistic, a fact of life, which does not arouse any particular sentiment. But to be part of that statistic provokes a totally different feeling. Most unpleasant here is the absolute uncertainty as regards an unspent vacation or the future of one's family. Every employee is always haunted by the likelihood of losing his job, and girds himself appropriately. Thus he pays dues to cover loss of work which are complemented halfway by his employer. He also puts money aside for "a rainy day" either as an investment nest egg or a bank deposit. He tries to acquire some sideline, even should it not meet all his needs, in short be prepared for any

would have held in store, had not one of us secured a job again.

I started job hunting the moment I found myself out of work. The ordinary Soviet person is conditioned to hired employment in his mind as starting one's own business is for somebody else. In the States job placement is also an industry. Firstly you have federal and state employment agencies, who do not charge you for their services, but whose results are minimal. Secondly, you have similar private agencies, for whose services you must pay. During recessions these agencies prosper. Some really get you employment. Charges differ. Sometimes an advance payment is demanded.

Others may require a deposit, with the remainder paid up over a certain period of time after one gets a job. Sometimes the employer pays the fee, which, as a rule, is equivalent to one's monthly pay. Finally, there may be a combination of the fees mentioned, or a percentage deducted from the pay over the entire period which is usually when the job is temporary, of no more than six months or so.

There are also sundry public organizations, ethnic clubs, trade unions, associations of the liberal professions and the like, that will help.

However, the most common job-hunting approach is via newspaper advertisements, as even when recessions are worst, and employees are laid off wholesale, newspapers feature a plethora of want ads, true often not for the

kind of job you are looking for.

Most people secure jobs with the help of family and friends.

The farmers

Each time I visit a farmer friend of mine in the States, I note a similarity and yet a difference as compared to his Soviet counterpart. One is impressed by his love of the land, and his farm, by the cleanliness of milking, by the machinery and the crop. In short, I find it much to my

Capitalism — it is easy

Chi Kagov



eventuality. The view current in the former USSR that Westerners can get by on unemployment benefit alone is erroneous.

Thus when my wife found herself out of work for the first time, we got along more or less decently on my pay and her benefit. But when that benefit was stopped six months later we had to make do with my pay alone. And when I lost my job, my unemployment benefit was definitely inadequate for my family of four. I do not know what the future

liking. Let me note that in my time I saw plenty of Soviet villages in the Altai, in Siberia and the Ukraine, and so have what to go by.

My farmer friend lives in his own house with his young wife and three kids. But as he has a car and the roads are excellent, he does not feel isolated. He has a plot to grow vegetables and melons, cattle and a small poultry run. He buys most of the products he needs at the supermarket in the town that is several miles away. He also receives a whole heap of agronomical publications and closely follows farming innovations.

From boyhood he has been fond of things mechanical and is ready to invest money and soul. The basic difference from Soviet machinery is, even though I am no professional in that respect, that they are devised for the person who uses them. The Soviet tractor is constructed to till the land and the Soviet farmer is there to service the tractor. But the American tractor, caters to the farmer tilling the land. This attitude derives not only from common sense, but also, and chiefly so from the competition factor.

Each time I visit my friend he shows me the latest models, which are still better than the previous ones. The pleasure is doubtlessly costly, as a truck costs \$15,000, a baler \$20,000 and a tractor \$75,000. As his annual income minus taxes ranges between \$30,000 and \$40,000, he gets the money for such "expensive toys" by borrowing from the bank.

It is not that easy to obtain a cheap product by balancing income and expenditure. After all, machinery, chemicals, seed material and rent go up from year to year, as do the taxes. Competition also stiffens, so much so that some farmers in the area were ruined and were forced to sell their land. In America nowadays that is run-of-the-mill, with the proportion of petty farmers as well as of petty landowners dwindling. Still my farmer friend is working successfully and is even gradually buying up the land he leases.

One day he pointed out to me offhandedly as it were, from his car a huge field which, he said, he was not planting, as he was to receive a bonus for not doing so. This did not come as a surprise to me as years back when still in college, I heard a foreign radio station note that the US administration encouraged farmers not to plant crops, thus combatting overproduction. To a Soviet ear that sounded absurd. But it is one thing to hear about it, and quite another to see this for yourself. The scale came as a shock.

There are many sides to this problem, emotional, political and economic. What indeed could be bad about superabundance? It appears that then products are too cheap and then farmers are unable to meet expenses and are ruined, which means there would not be enough farmers to supply America with enough food.

However, couldn't the surplus product be purchased from the farmer in place of the subsidies mentioned and have the poor provided thereby? There is nothing novel about this wonderful concept which is constantly in the eye of thousands of charities, even the federal administration itself. If remember once seeing people in the street being supplied from trucks with huge heads of cheese that had come from federal surplus reserves, which are made up of some of the products purchased by the government from farmers solely to maintain market prices at the proper level. Yet there is a bad side to this, as when people get something for free they have no incentive to work, to earn. This, let alone the inevitably attendant smaller consumer demand for farm products.

Thus after totting up all the pros and cons, America arrived at the difficult, I would say anti-capitalist solution, of helping the farmer to keep abreast of the market.

How come, that while comprising a negligible proportion of the population and despite restricted output, America's farmers are in a position to feed not only their own country, but half the world into the bargain?

The clue is simple. It derives not only from the industriousness with which the farmers produce, but from the pattern of relationships between every party involved, from farmer and bank to machine maker and landowner.

Land tenure

Generally speaking the farmer owns his farm like any businessman his own firm. But in the same way as a factory owner need not necessarily possess the buildings, so the farmer need not necessarily cultivate exclusively his own land.

Many own land. Some are farmers themselves. However, most are investors or banks. In America most farmers cultivate land that is owned by others. Thus the land my friend tills is owned by several parties, including him. When it is said that in America all the cultivated land is privately owned, meant are not farmers but landowners. The landowner is one of the basic factors involved in the agronomical process. However involved is not only purchase of land to thereby lease it, and collect after each year's crop. As the purchase of land,

like all other property is an investment, this means firstly one must pay the bank its rates, as few can afford to buy land with cash on the barrel and, secondly, pay the annual land tax. Besides that, the money invested in land must necessarily yield a dividend not less but if possible even more, than if invested elsewhere.

No wonder, that after leasing his land the landowner does not wash his hands off the entire affair. He has many cares. His land must not only retain, but even improve its fertility, as it is upon this that the crop and hence dividends, as well as the future price of this land were its owner to sell it, depend.

The land is leased to the farmer for not more than a year as a rule. However, the land as such must always be seen to. The owners of the land that my farmer friend leases never lose sight of that, to which end they employ the services of a special land management agency that in turn allots a special manager to look after the land.

As a competent agronomist, the said manager implements a perennial strategy of tenure, watching over the rational and prompt use of fertilizer, crop rotation, and a drive against weeds and pests. As his own earnings depend on crop yields, he has a personal stake in fertility and bumper crops.

The manager goes all out to keep the farmer abreast of the latest agronomical novelties. He also follows the market situation and often suggests what crops should be cultivated with an eye to future prices. Bearing the responsibility for some 40 odd farms, the manager puts his best foot forward to have his farmers outvie those of his competitor, which adds to his reputation, and prestige, as well as his own personal stake in the end product.

The relationships between farmers, managers, landowners and the other parties involved comprise part of the overall system of the relationships of production under capitalism. Interests more than simply interweave: they dovetail. Small wonder they conjointly yield such abundance in the country year after year.

Some of the parties involved contribute to the end product indirectly. These are the countless promoters of new machinery, the salesmen, who demonstrate agricultural novelties and new chemicals and seed materials, as well as the staff of the management firms mentioned. With a lot of "non-producing" personnel described earlier, one may call them, as they do not produce anything of their own, the mid-dlemen.

(To be continued)

AIDS is 70

A new theory into the origins of AIDS: the dark side of medical experiments

Experiments on convicts in American prisons may have been the reason why the HIV virus appeared. This theory though has nothing in common with the once popular Moscow speculation about the Pentagon's involvement in the creation of HIV in a secret laboratory. It has turned out, though, that American scientists were engaged in ill-conceived experiments with samples of ape blood containing a similar virus. This is the conclusion of the British scientist, Charles Gilks, who has been involved in "the investigation of the medical crime" which continues to cause more and more people suffer and die. When it comes to finding the right answer to how HIV originated, the problem acquires not only purely medical, but also a political, moral and ethnical dimension.

Passions are flaring up in Africa, which is recognized as the centre of the proliferation of at least the simian version of HIV. The attempt to find the way the simian virus was transmitted to humans generated an interest, and not always scientific, to the sexual habits of some African tribes. The less insulting hypotheses — ape bites, and people eating infected ape meat — may be realistic, but they evoke too many doubts.


In any case, the previous conviction, that HIV originated in Central Africa in the middle of the 1970s was brought by Cuban troops and travelers to America where it hit the gay community, has been questioned recently when an Oxford expert published his article in the respectable scientific magazine *Nature*. The Gilks version removes suspicion from the Africans, but this does not seem a great comfort to them: Africa continues to remain notorious for the

world's highest AIDS proliferation rates.

When he worked in The Nairobi Centre For Medical Studies Charles Gilks found some documents that demonstrated that in 1920–1930 African apes were taken to US and European research centres as part of the anti-malaria research effort. In what now appears to be a highly dangerous experiment, simian blood containing malaria cultures was administered to at least 70 convicts whom US law allows to be used as "voluntary" assistants. The documents showed that chimpanzee blood was administered to 34 convicts and blood of other apes to the rest of the group. There is also some evidence that the infected convicts' blood was then injected to other people.

This experiment was carried out as a way to cure severe forms of syphilis in which the brain is damaged. Syphilis bacteria are very sensitive to a rise in the temperature of the human body, and malaria develops a fever in the organism. Theoretically, the bacteria were supposed to die upon the injection of malaria-infected blood and the patient's general condition was supposed to improve. The thermal-therapy was used even in the 1950s and the Swedish AIDS expert, Hans Wigzell, believes it may still be in use in some places.

The British scientist believes that as a result of these experiments HIV was transmitted from apes to humans. Evidently, there must have been many more such experiments but so far these experiments remain the only documentally proven direct channel of contact between human and simian blood. The virus which is widespread among macaques, chimpanzees and similar simians belong to the same family as HIV-1 and HIV-2. The delayed appearance of AIDS can be explained by a process of mutation the virus underwent in the human organism.



Queen's Freddie Mercury — one of the latest AIDS victims
Photo from Guardian (G.B.)

Now the Gilks theory has to be supported by a thorough study of blood samples which may have survived since the experiments with malaria and an examination of all documents about experiments with malaria and thermotherapy for the curing of syphilis. A criminal study must help reveal the potential progress of the virus from person to person in the past sixty-seventy years. It is difficult to visualize the tremendous amount of information to be processed to get the names of every participant in even one such chain.

"The theory will present practical interest only if there is direct evidence to support it," Hans Wigzell believes. "If there is no evidence, the world may never get to know whether AIDS is divine punishment or a man-made disease..."

Alexander Polyukhov,
our own correspondent

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The meaning of the collapse of communism

It is history's only ideological experiment

J.A. Naik*

Looking at the kind of discussion over the collapse of communism in Russian and international press, one feels that we have not fully grasped the significance of this historic development. What we have witnessed is much larger than the failure of a political, economic and social system, which had rocked the whole world for well over three generations. The significance of the collapse of communism is far greater than what comes forth in the Cold War context.

Significance

What was tried and found as failed was a unique thing. It is for the first time since the dawn of civilization that the validity of a political ideology was under experiment in a human society. The ideology of socialism was tried in Soviet Russia for well over 70 years, a socialist society was constructed over there and it was ultimately found that the ideology of Marxism has failed to live up to its ordained course. It was history's first ever social experiment of its kind and in this experiment it has been proved that the ideology of Marxism is defective, unsound and totally counter-productive. The failure of communism has been proved in as scientific a manner as is humanly possible. No other ideology has been so tried and its failure so proved. In this extra-ordinary experiment, it has been proved that the claims made by the doctrine of communism cannot be realized by the path shown by Karl Marx.

Some Marxists may loudly object to such a contention. According to them, there is nothing wrong with Marxism, but something had gone wrong with its implementation in Soviet Russia over the course of years and that is why the Soviet model of communism has collapsed. Is it so?

In order to assess the validity of such a contention, one has to probe into the perception of the Soviet model itself.

Universal failure

Anywhere around 200 students, mostly teenagers, had gone to Soviet Russia from India every year during the last more than twenty years. A vast majority of them had gone there for their degree course and had lived there for about six years. They all knew Russian language and they all had immense opportunities to mix up with Russians. They went there when they were still teenagers and returned back to India after spending the most influential period of their lives. After careful scrutiny of most communist leaders of most communist parties in India, I can say that I have not come across a single communist leader who had sprang up from the ranks of thousands of such returnees from Soviet Russia and other East European communist countries. As a rule, they went there with open heart and returned back becoming highly skeptical of Soviet Russia and its Marxism. Under similar circumstances a whole generation of Indian students, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Jyoti Basu, had gone to England in pre-independence days for education, when famous Lasky was teaching at the London School of Economics, and returned back to India getting themselves converted to socialism of some sort. The young Indian students became socialists in

England but they failed to become communists in Soviet Russia. Why is it so? Do people become socialists because something has gone wrong with capitalism and not because everything is right with socialism? Is socialism a reaction to capitalism?

Hegel vs Marx

Socialism's collapse shows victory of Hegel over Marx. Karl Marx's Guru, Hegel, had ordained a perennial course of history in the form of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Marx had upheld Hegel in his assessment of socialism as an anti-thesis against capitalism. He had rightly perceived socialism's strength of reaction against capitalism and the underlying universality of such a development. Where Marx has gone wrong is in assessing that the anti-thesis would be permanent and it may not give birth to a synthesis. The thesis of capitalism gave birth to an anti-thesis of socialism and now the anti-thesis of socialism has given birth in the one-time communist countries to a synthesis of social democracy of a kind.

Ideological imperfections

Communism has collapsed primarily because of its ideological imperfections. The concept of social ownership of the means of production is the essence of communism and this essential aspect of communism cannot be implemented without recourse to Stalinism. Some farmers may opt for collective farms and communes but not all in the villages and those who so opt may not always remain in the collective farms or communes. Those who do not join the collective system have to be forced to do so or remain therein, or else there can be no collectivisation of the economy at the village level.

*An Indian Sovietologist and author of *Soviet Policy Towards India - From Stalin to Brezhnev* and other books.

Hence Stalinism is inescapable part of communism in the initial stages when the communists are engaged into transforming their social and economic relationships. Once the route of Stalinism is taken for building socialism, it can not be abandoned for retaining the system because the system cannot afford to give freedom to farmers to leave the collectives and communes. Once such a freedom is given, collectivisation collapses. It took nearly fifty years for the Soviets to realise that collective farms do not provide incentives to farmers to produce more goods and hence the agricultural economy suffered. In China too communes were abandoned after practicing them for a generation. But the reform came from above, not from within, which could not transform the system or solve the problem of production of agricultural or industrial goods.

By far the most noticeable defect of the communist model is its craze for perfection. Such a perfection is only conceptual and can never be a reality in practice. All socio-economic systems are always imperfect because they are the result of relationships between individuals and no two individuals are alike in their make-up or aspirations. Hence there can be no totalitarian model of perfection. Capitalism under free democratic societies admits of such imperfection and goes on improving itself under institutional and individual pressures. Totalitarianism of any kind never admits imperfection of its model and hence all reforms in it turn out to be superficial. In this sense, all dictatorships are irreformable for the lack of freedom among people who live under them and whose task is to reform the system. It was Aristotle who had said it long back that the wearer alone knows where the shoe pinches. Under dictatorships the wearer cannot be allowed to say that the shoe has been pinching him and hence he has to live with discontent until the discontent of all causes the collapse of the system itself.

The multi-lingual, multi-religious Soviet state was divided from within right from the beginning. But under the ideological compulsions of treating economic classes alone as the real classes in society, communist societies in Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia had never faced the problem of social con-

flicts arising out of different nationalities. That is why different nationalities are up in arms against each other and against the central authority once they have the freedom to do it. Had Marxism admitted of social classes on the basis of race, religion, language, culture, history, etc., Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia would not have found it so difficult to survive as unified states after the collapse of communism. Social classes of all kinds are real and any attempt to give importance to one class at the negligence of another has to boomerang in course of time when people are free to react. Which kind of social class is more important than another depends upon the circumstances under which a particular society lives. Economic classes were more important than other classes in Western Europe when Karl Marx had lived. Social divisions based on the caste system are more important than economic classes in India and

that is why ideologically antagonistic political parties like the Communist Party of India (Marxists) and the Bharatiya Janata Party, which are led by the high caste Brahmins and Kayasthas, have adopted identical stands on the highly explosive issue in contemporary Indian politics of reservation of jobs for low caste Hindus. Social classes based on nationalities have become more important in the multi-national communist countries and are proving the biggest problems after the collapse of communism in such countries. The point is, there is no one universal disease afflicting all societies at all times and hence no one prescription can solve all the problems facing different societies. Communism's inability to perceive this reality is its greatest ideological deficiency. By their very nature human societies are plural in all respects and any attempt to treat them not so is destined to prove fatal.

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Introduced by New Times analyst Rostislav Zolotaryov

The writings by Yuri Veniaminovich Klyuchnikov — a name which means little to most people today — have lost none of their topical value. This is true, in particular, of his book *Internationalism. The Basic Problems of International Relations* (1918). Fragments of its chapter devoted to federalism will be found below.

Klyuchnikov tried to ascertain — objectively and in the legal tradition of his time — the merits and demerits of a federation and a confederation (those were the only forms of international associations known then). He thought that the future was with a federation as a political system which

best combines the principles of freedom and equality with material welfare and external security requirements. At the same time he did not rule out the prospect of new types of viable interstate associations emerging. His work accords a deeper insight into the national state formations which are taking shape in place of the former Union of states.

Only scraps of information about Klyuchnikov's life have come down to us. In 1917, he was a free-lance Moscow University lecturer and a regular contributor to the *Russkoye Slovo* newspaper. A reputable researcher, he was actively involved in politics. In 1918, he took part in the Left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries' uprising in Yaroslavl. Later, he was a head of the Ufa Directory's foreign ministry and the chief of the diplomatic service of Admiral Kol-

chak's "Omsk government." In 1919, he quarreled with the Kolchak council of ministers, resigned from his post, and emigrated. From 1920 on Klyuchnikov opposed using the force of arms against the Bolshevik government.

In 1921, he contributed an article to the *Smena Vekh* anthology. The article — which, incidentally, the anthology got its name from — became its ideological guide. In 1921-22, Klyuchnikov was editor-in-chief of the *Smena Vekh* journal published in Paris. In the same period, he wrote the book entitled *At the Crossroads of History*, in which he pondered over the sources of revolution and over the possibility of evolutionary development. Although Klyuchnikov was a "White Guard emigrant," Lenin had him in-

cluded in the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference as an expert. In August 1923, he returned to Russia and even held a post at the Communist Academy, where he did research in the sphere of the history and theory of international relations and law. His works were never published, however. In 1938, the wave of repression engulfed him, too.

FROM THE
XXth
CENTURY
POLITICAL
THOUGHT

Lest we should feel squashed together...

Yuri Klyuchnikov (1886-1938)

The notion of state supremacy or *sovereignty* is a touchstone for determining the legal and political nature of a union of states. Where are the sceptre and the purple of supreme power to be found in a confederation? Does the sovereignty right belong to the union itself or to its constituent member states?

Most researchers regard *independence* of the member states as one of the chief characteristics of a confederation; consequently, the member states keep full powers of government.

Almost all agree on a *treaty* necessarily being the basis of any confederation, and on any confederation necessarily being an object of *international* rather than national law. Wherever international law remains in force, however, it leaves no room for new sovereignty, for new general supreme power, because any sovereignty marks a transition from the sphere of international relations to the sphere of relations within a state, from a treaty to law.

It is noteworthy in this connection that confederations form only common government bodies representing the governments of the states forming the given confederation; no new nation, as a single whole, emerges from states joining together into a confederation. The citizens of all the states which make it up remain the subjects of those states and acquire no new citizenship. Their own supreme governments stay in office, and they neither have to apply to federal bodies on matters which come within their national governments' spheres of reference, nor feel dependent on those federal bodies in any way.

There is no reason to believe, as some do, that all the decisions in the union should necessarily be made by the member states' governments unanimously, as is allegedly the case according to union treaty under international law. Resolutions on routine matters can well be passed by a simple majority vote. But any amendments in the union treaty itself can be made only by unanimous decision of all the representatives from the union's member states, and special

agreements should be reached on every such amendment. The reason for that is easy to see: an interstate union, the representative body of which can change the union treaty by a majority vote, and all the member states of which are supposed to accept these changes without demur, is not really a confederation but a single union state with a single supreme coercive government.

Indeed, preserving the principle of unanimity as the basis upon which to make amendments in the union treaty means keeping the sovereignty of the states which have entered into the union; likewise renouncing this principle would amount to these states losing their sovereignty as a forfeit for joining the union.

The sovereignty of confederation member states automatically presupposes their right to secession and nullification, i.e., the right to secede from the union if further stay in it threatens their vital interests and the right to declare null and void the union authority's resolutions on matters which are outside its jurisdiction.

The immediate purpose of forming a confederation is joint protection by the states involved of the international interests common to all of them. Political and economic interests usually go together, and the more of these interests the given states have in common, the vaster and denser the network of confederative ties will link them together. The forming of a confederation presupposes the establishment of this or that federal body — a council, a sejm, a congress — authorized to manage all the international affairs of the union, to declare wars, to sign agreements on behalf of the union, to mediate between a member of the union and a foreign power should the latter lay any claims to the former, to represent the union internationally. Individual member states of a confederation have no right to declare and wage war on any outside state, keep their right to independent representation (with only slight restrictions imposed upon it), while its freedom to sign agreements is curtailed only as far as it may harm the vital interests of the confederation itself. As for the interrelations between the member states of the confederation, the right to

wage wars upon one another, is taken away from them "absolutely"; the right to diplomatic representation is practically unrestricted but hardly exercised in practice at all because their representatives constantly communicate with one another at the federal level; the right to sign agreements is restricted to those of relatively minor importance.

At present, no confederation has a clear-cut legal physiognomy of its own. It would be a serious mistake to conclude therefore that this form of state association has hopelessly outlived itself and that the study of its legal nature and political expedience is only of purely historical or abstractly theoretical interest. First of all, entirely new and quite viable confederations of states can always be formed; and second, on its way towards a political and legal whole, the modern world simply cannot skip the stage of a general confederative unification of its huge and complex political organisms which will stay independent of one another the longest...

Nevertheless, a confederation cannot be regarded as a perfectly satisfactory form of states' unification or as the supreme achievement of self-asserting internationalism. From the angle of the interests of international solidarity, a confederation is far from irreproachable, and in certain individual cases the more fully the *federative principle* of equality and voluntariness is observed in the given union of states, the more serious reproaches can be cast upon confederative one. The trouble is that all the unions of this kind invariably displayed considerable internal weakness and instability and were held together for decades and even centuries only by its members' intense efforts or thanks to an extraordinarily fortunate situation in which they found themselves. The freedom they give their members is the freedom from many politically useful circumstances; on the contrary, the need which underlies any strong union is the need for its members to waive a certain amount of their "freedom."

Theoretically, a federation is the direct opposite of a confederation. The relationships between the members of a confederation are governed by international law, and those between the members of a federation, by *state law*. A confederation is based on a treaty, and a federation on *law* or on a treaty which at a certain moment becomes law of its own accord. In confederations, sovereignty is exercised by individual member states; in federations, by the central federal government or, according to another school of thought, by both the federal government and all the states collectively, not individually. Confederation members have the right to secession and nullification; federation members have no such rights. In a federation, amendments can be made in the constitution against individual members' will; in a confederation, this is never the case. Further, the central authority of a federation can *compel* the states to meet federal commitments, and that of a confederation cannot; the territory of a federation is regarded not only as the territory of individual states but as a common federal territory; the population of the states has double citizenship — state and federal. As for the

missions and functions of a federal state, they are not much different from those of any state.

It is easy enough to unlock the secret for the success of the "federative idea." Being a union and a state at one and the same time, a federation not only combines all the merits possessed by a union and a state taken separately, but also develops positive qualities of its own coming from the merger of these two types of community organization. As a union, each federation gives its states a considerable margin of freedom and full equality which, in the light of a modern sense of justice, is its great asset. As a state, a federation offers the small political organisms which have united into it all the advantages inherent in any large and strong state: the maximum concentration and saving of joint effort, an efficient and precise social mechanism,

a sense of unity, a wealth of material and labour resources and, finally, overall external security. The unions of free states held together by a treaty alone are, as the record of confederations shows, unstable and, while spending enormous amounts of energy, get only meagre results.

On the other hand, the states

which totally disregard the specific features of and situations in their separate parts and which rule all these parts by injunction from one centre can give their peoples neither happiness nor prosperity either. But then, the freedom and equality of nations which have voluntarily joined into a new and larger community as its constituent parts and at the same time their self-subordination, self-restriction and self-deprivation of "unbridled freedom" as part of sharing their responsibilities within the framework of a single whole — such are the only conditions on which genuine progress towards internationalism is possible at all. It is in such communities that similarity in the character of internal and international processes is particularly apparent. Indeed, perfectly identical problems of power and subordination arise in the process of a new union state taking shape, and within a unitarian state seeking to "put its house in order." For perfectly identical reasons, independent nations do not go beyond certain limits as they join together into communities, and individual parts of a unitarian state seek to secure as large a margin of local self-government as they can. Both integrated international communities and unitary states are affected by the same laws. Both use identical means towards identical ends. Under the circumstances it is only natural that the union state has long since been regarded not only as a model new large states will be modelled upon but, at the same time, as the only prototype of a future worldwide community of nations which will put an end to all wars and realize the noble ideal of a universal eternal peace.

*Prepared for publication by
Valentin Manuilov
(Penza)*

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
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
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"In 1964, when I became a father for the first time, I myself was almost a boy. But now, being an adult person, I feel happiness more fully than ever." **Alain Delon**, 56, the most celebrated film actor of France, find his happiness hard to believe. The actor, who captivated millions of women the world over, is enraptured with his little daughter **Anushka** born a year ago in his marriage with **Rosalie Van Breemen**, Miss Holland, who is 28 years his younger.

"The birth of Anushka was the greatest shock in my life," the actor says. "From now on all my life will belong to her. The rest is of no importance."

Alain Delon got acquainted with his present wife four years ago at the presentation of the record "Comme au cinema" and asserts it was love at first sight.

Considered a Don Juan (even Romy Schneider could not resist his charms), Delon contends that he did not seduce any woman. "The initiation has always been taken by a woman," he says. Is it

really so? The last film with the participation of Delon is called "Il ritorno di Casanova".

* * *

New analysts think that **Rudolph Streicher**, 52, the current minister of transport, has the best chance of success in the presidential election to be held in Austria next April. He was nominated for the presidency by the ruling Social Democratic Party.

Born into a worker's family, Rudolph began

his working career as a mechanic. The successful completion of the Mining Academy in Leoben opened for him the way to leading posts in the public sector of the economy. Six years ago, being director-general of one of the country's largest companies, **Steyr Deimler-Puch**, Streicher was invited by Chancellor **Wranicki** to join his cabinet in which he showed his worth as a talented manager and an ardent champion of privatization, owing to which he was able to save many unprofitable state-owned enterprises.

Streicher intends to remain in the post of minister till spring and devote only days-off to the election campaign. In the event of a failure he plans to return to business. True, the minister has one more "extra" profession. He fervently loves music




and conducting. He regularly conducts the orchestra of Austrian railway workers. Not long ago Rudolph conducted even the world famous Vienna symphony orchestra, which played brilliantly several suites under his direction.

An enthusiastic angler and hunter, Streicher likes to ski and walk in the mountains. Asked the other day with whom he would like to spend an evening, he replied: "With Mikhail Gor-

bachev".

A.Kovrigin
NT correspondent
VIENNA

* * *



Of the 14 million Kurds living in the world, 60-year-old

Nadir Nadirov is the first and only academician, a member of the scientific council for petroleum chemistry at the Academy of Sciences.

Nadir was born in the Kikach village in the Nakhichevan autonomous republic. When he was six years old, his family was deported to the Kazakh steppes. Nadir still remembers that day in 1937 when NKVD men came to their house and ordered them to pack up their things. The Kurds lived in huts and they were strictly forbidden to leave their reservations.

Two years ago Nadirov joined the struggle for

A newspaper for the man in the street

In the middle of July last year Kazakhstan's capital Alma-Ata was stirred by the appearance of a new independent newspaper, *Karavan*, which quickly became one of the most popular in the city.

Its founder and chief editor is 56-year-old **Grigory Breigin**, a journalist who worked in different Kazakh periodicals for over 30 years, a former correspondent of the newspaper *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* in the Altai region and in Volgograd.

Three years ago Grigory Breigin unexpectedly left the post of chief editor at the Kazakhtelefilm studios and plunged into independent journalism. However, the appearance of the first issue of *Karavan* was postponed for a long time.

"*Karavan* is an unusual newspaper for Kazakhstan," Breigin says. "We have dared to state right away that we are publishing a newspaper for the man in the street. I don't see any degrading meaning in these words."

The newspaper is not political. "Our policy is our attitude to present-day realities. It is information about current events. It is the colouring of reports published in the newspaper," Breigin points out.

Grigory Breigin regrets only that he undertook the publishing of a newspaper a little late because his heyday has already passed. Nevertheless, the 50,000 copies of *Karavan* are sold in one day.

M.Rostovsky




the rights of the Kurdish people who were subjected to repression in the years of Soviet government. The Kurds were scattered in nine republics of the Soviet Union. Two years ago the Paris institute of Kurdish affairs invited Nadirov to take part in an international conference on human rights. He brought with him a report on the condition of Kurds in the Soviet Union. In his paper Nadirov called for the restoration of Soviet Kurdistan and the return of Kurds to the land of their ancestors. In this way he found himself in the centre of attention of the European press and soon became a guest of honour at many conferences on human rights.

Nadirov heads the campaign "Social progress of Kurds" carried on in Moscow and Alma-Ata since July of last year. "My purpose is to highlight the dire plight of the Kurdish nation," he says.

"Moscow is a province of Paris," says **Jean Pons**, a 78-year-old Frenchman who arrived in Moscow for the first time with a lithographic exhibition of the Paris school called "Jean Pons and his Russian friends."

Pons invited to his Paris studio talented Russian emigré artists Vasily Kandinsky, Mark Shagal and Mikhail Larionov, Marcel Marceau, Jean Cocteau and Serge Poliakoff, and Pablo Picasso — he was on friendly terms with all of them. Thanks to Pons's meeting and joint work with artists from Eastern Europe Paris art has acquired a new, Russian aspect.

Also interesting is his acquaintance with Henri Matisse. On a sunny day



in 1951 the famous artist dropped into a private garments shop owned by Pons's wife. He wanted to buy a present for his wife but, having seen pictures hanging in the interior of the shop, exclaimed: "What a good artist! I would never dare myself to approach the Master."

The exhibitions of the lithographer were held in

Germany, Denmark, Norway, Eastern Europe, and finally in Moscow. The artist says that during short visit to the capital he was impressed by its wide streets, a lot of verdure, nice children and beautiful women.

International detente will evidently prove favourable even for **Vittorio**

Emmanuele, the 54-year-old heir to the Italian throne who was compelled to live in neighbouring Switzerland for 45 years now. A special provision of the Constitution, which abolished monarchy and established a republic system, forbids male offsprings of the last King Umberto I to step on the soil of their ancestors and even cross the threshold of Italian diplomatic missions abroad (the ban does not spread to the female part of the king's family).

The frivolous life of Vittorio Emmanuele often put advocates of the House of Savoy in a difficult position. The prince's adventures in vice dens of various European cities, conflicts with the police, flirting with fash-



ionable dancers and, lastly, marriage with an "improper" woman two years older than him have seriously undermined the monarchist sentiments in Italy. In addition to all this a strange event resulting in the murder of a German tourist took place 13 years ago. The fatal shot was fired by the Italian prince, who was arrested, handcuffed and put in prison. It was in November of 1991 that the prince was finally acquitted by the jury. Vittorio Emmanuele will be charged only with the unlawful possession of arms. It should be noted that all these years he was at liberty.

After the verdict of not guilty was passed by the jury the prince declared that he would fight tooth and nail to get repealed the constitutional provision forbidding him to return to Italy. This question was raised in particular at a meeting between the prince's sister Maria Gabriela and Italian President Cossiga. The princess said that the President referred to her for the first time as Your Highness and assured her that he would use all his influence so that the Crown prince could visit Italy.

About India with love

Unlike the 007 agent James Bond, **Ruskin Bond**, a popular and perhaps the most prolific writer of India, does not engage in motor racing and has no liking for Martinis. There is simply no room for speed driving in the narrow streets of the little town of Massuri at the foothills of the Himalays, in which he has lived for 27 years now. Ruskin Bond has written over 200 stories, almost as many essays, and 40 children's books. As for a Martini, the drinking of it is contra-indicated for cancer patients. Such was the diagnosis made for Bond.

Nevertheless, at 57 the writer is still bright and cheerful, spending at his desk three hours a day. He draws on topics for his stories from present-day realities, rightly asserting that one can see real India not in large cities but in villages and small towns like Massuri.

Ruskin Bond does not think that a good writer must travel a lot, and therefore he seldom leaves his town. However, for some time he came twice a month to the Bombay court, because he was accused of indecency for the publication of the story *Voluptuary*. After a stormy youth, the main character of this story decided to leave the world and life in seclusion. But having spent many years in the mountains he occasionally recalled his youthful escapades. The trial ended in the acquittal of Ruskin Bond. However, since then he has not dared write stories on similar topics.



S.Irodov
NT correspondent

DELHI

Blessed are those banished for telling the truth

Their Russian remains excellent and their faces remain Russian

Alexei Adzhubei

A play just staged by Moscow's Mayakovsky Drama Company is full of extraordinary happenings. It was not for nothing that the author gave it the intriguing name of *Who's Afraid of Ray Bradbury?* The action revolves around three pairs of twins: two sculptor brothers, their twin wives and two elderly look-alike lady neighbours. As the story unfolds, however, it turns out that one of the elderly ladies is long dead and that her twin sister keeps the body under the bed. The characters in the play have been unaware of this for a long time. "Someone" — a secret service agent, as it later transpires — tries to unravel the mystery. He has long ago found out there is just one old lady who pulls the wool over her neighbours' eyes by changing into her late sister's dress from time to time. The agent neither investigates the major crime, nor looks for witnesses. He is interested only in the potions the surviving old lady — that "relic of the past" — uses to prevent her dead sister's body from putrefaction without having recourse to learned consultants. That information is crucial for some important undertaking. "It would make things much simpler and cheaper up there," he says, meaningfully pointing to the ceiling.

A lonely sail?

All this is but an exotic garnish to the main theme of the play, which is about a much more complicated and serious problem. One of the sculptor brothers lives a prosperous life abroad, the other lives in Moscow and suffers from all sorts of complexes. He and his vain wife agonizingly ponder over the alternative of following the successful brother or staying behind.

Suddenly, a rich and noisy "foreign couple" make their appearance at the studio like a bolt from the blue. A boisterous vodka party given in their honour

comes to an unexpected end. The newcomers turn out not to be so happy as they look, after all, and their merriness comes not from easy living but from irrepressible bravado. The brothers and their wives quarrel. The Muscovites do not believe the stories their relatives tell, and then the latter give them their own passports (no one will notice the substitution on the border, the brothers are twins) and suggest they go and see for themselves.

A boy, whose family lives next door to the studio, appears on stage. He doesn't realize that the couple in the studio are strangers. The lights go out slowly, leaving the stage in semi-darkness. Suddenly, the boy starts reciting a poem by Lermontov: "A lone white sail shows for an instant, where gleams the sea, an azure streak. What left it in its homeland distant? In alien parts what does he seek?"

Hadn't the play been by Vladimir Maksimov, the "malicious dissident" banished from Moscow thirteen years ago, I would have taken it for another propaganda piece on the subject: do not leave your Motherland, you won't find happiness abroad. The

spectators knew, however, who the author was and that the play told a true story about the writer's own feelings and sufferings.

The audience applauded the play and the author who answered the curtain calls in person, confirming by his presence the right to say things the way he had.

"Whites" and "Reds"

Three years ago — or was it ages ago? — I visited the Russian cemetery in Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois. Strictly speaking, it was purely Russian once, but now belongs to the local municipality. The Russians bury their dead in old graves there. The place became too small even for the dead. It was only at the end of the eighties that the necropolis, the last resting-place of Bunin, Merezhkovsky, Gippius, Tarkovsky, Galich, Nekrasov — to name but a few, ceased to be taboo for Soviet periodicals. As I was looking for their graves, something stopped me. Among snow-white crosses, I spotted a small obelisk, and, at a closer glance, read an epitaph on it to General Denikin's officers and men. A little farther there lined up, as if in battle formation, tombstones on the graves of the "Drozdovtsi," the Wrangel army's officers.

The "Whites" lay buried there. Myself, I was brought up as a "Red." A vague sense of discomfort and melancholy drove me away from that place. Presently I found the cross on Alexander Galich's grave. It bore just one line by way of a farewell from his relatives and friends: "Blessed are those banished for telling the truth..."



Paris, 1947. A meeting of Russian emigrants

For telling the truth! How hard it is to find the truth and remain true to it, without shouting our highfaluting words or instantly changing colours. Standing there, I thought about what used to seem unshakable and everlasting but what eventually crumbled away. Is that easy to accept? And those who easily adapt themselves to changed circumstances, are they really sincere in saying that they have seen the light, at once? As Leo Tolstoy aptly put it, before you learn to tell the truth, you must learn to be truthful to yourself.

Strangely, it is now all the rage in our country to glorify the "Whites" and to castigate the "Reds." Those held responsible for Russia's woes have now come to include the Decembrists, Herzen, members of the *Narodnaya Volya* organization, Social Democrats, and even Anna Akhmatova. Maksimov told me that some people even put her in a class with the "submachine-gunner" poets Gribachev and Sofronov. And, of course, the renunciation of Lenin, the Bolsheviks and the bloody dictator Stalin is all in a day's work. I am ashamed of those who have learned to make the sign of the cross without believing in God. Why all this pretension?

In Moscow, one can already hear the chiming of the bells and even, occasionally, the singing of muezzins. Isn't it great that an end has been put to intolerance and moral ignorance and man has acquired the right to believe in what he regards as holy — by conviction, not by order. The fund-raising campaign for the restoration of the church of Christ the Saviour, demolished in the thirties, is about to start (if it hasn't started yet). I expected the church hierarchs to tell their congregations: "Wait, brethren, the time is not ripe for this yet. Every cock counts today. Let us restore the church in our souls, to start with." I have never heard them say that. Neither have I ever seen a flower laid at the Arc of Triumph, erected in commemoration of the Russian arms' victory over Napoleon.

A shed-like stone structure, painted grey, is lost among high-rise apartment blocks on Moscow's Novoslobodskaya street. I asked ten or so passers-by what it was. No one could satisfy my curiosity. No one knew that the tiny chapel had been built on the money scraped together by the survivors of Peter the Great's first Azov campaign.

The Poklonnaya Hill has been levelled off. Plans are in the air to erect a pompous Victory Monument there in time for the 50th anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat. We simply must have this monument, you see, although the bones of our still unburied war dead are scattered over the vast expanses of the country. Incidentally, how heavy a toll did that war take on the nation's manhood? Was it 20 million (Khrushchev's figure) or 27 million (Gorbachev's figure)?

A nationwide competition for the best Victory Monument idea has been announced, but somehow we cannot make up our mind to return the "Treptow Park soldier" to Moscow. Although that monument by Vuchetich is no great work of art, there are many reasons why

we ought to bring it back. One reason, and by no means the least important one, is that our relationship with Germany has changed. Why should we wait for Herr Genscher's formal announcement of the fact? As far as I know there are no other monuments to the Victor like that in any defeated country. Those killed in action ought to be buried at home. The present situation being what it is, who of their relatives can afford to go over to Germany to visit their graves? Our troops will be withdrawn from Germany in 1994. I am certain that the graves will be kept in perfect order after that. On remembrance days, however, the Treptow Park will be deserted.

The "have-beens" in flesh and blood

It so happened that after Vladimir Maksimov's play I saw a documentary by Vladislav Vinogradov on the same theme: the price we pay for what has been inculcated in us over the years — hatred for the differently-minded. Until quite recently we have referred to the fragments of the former tsarist empire, such as the charity institution kept by Princess Vera Kirillovna Meshcherskaya, as "the Russia House" outside Russia." Again, the Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois cemetery, again the graves. But the film is about the living. About the survivors, that is. They are over eighty, some over ninety.

The director of the film could easily wax melodramatic. Or eulogistic. He did neither. We knew, of course, that White Guard generals and officers became taxi drivers, balalaika players and waiters in restaurants. We laughed ourselves coarse at the scene from the film *Flight* after Bulgakov where a dashing general strutted along Paris streets in his underwear on the way to his millionaire friend's home. Then the general and his host — played superbly by the great actors Ulianov and Yevstigneyev — had a game of cards, and the general, tipsy after downing a few vodkas on an empty stomach, smothered the millionaire with moist kisses against the latter's vigorous protests.

We knew about all that. But we didn't know something else. Namely, that those people were to be found not only in graves and plays. That they still existed in this world. That their fates linked the early twentieth century with the approaching twenty-first century. The world of the people out of old newsreels, which were of purely historical interest to us, suddenly came back to life in modern documentaries. One couldn't help thinking: my God, are these the "have-beens," the men and women of a long-gone epoch, in flesh and blood? What are they going to tell us today, in this time of hard trials, of rude awakening and hopes.

There is not a shade of smugness in their conversation, their facial expression is serene. There is an air of tacit compassion about them, and their implied message to us

seems to go as follows: "We have gone through times like these, keep your human dignity, never stoop to revenge, do not nourish the vain hopes of avenging yourselves on those now in the dust."

Their Russian remains excellent, and their faces remain Russian. The picture is by a Petersburg film-maker which imparts to it the classical simplicity characteristic of that city and its residents, past and present.

We see General Denikin's daughter, Admiral Stark's nephew, Father Siluyan, the cemetery priest, and many others.

The way I see it, Vladimir Maksimov's reflections and the documentary about the Russia House have much in common. Nevertheless, I shall never accept hysterical nihilism. I shall never stop admiring Papanin, Chkalov, Korolev, Landau, Ulanova, Shostakovich and my contemporaries like Akhmadulina, Lyubimov, Okudzhava, Aitmatov, Vysotsky. Incidentally, some even go as far as to say that the latter is better off dead, that he had accomplished his mission and said all he had to say.

Ignorance fits into the simple formula of cause and effect. Many authors are now engaged in masochistic soul-searching. Instead, they'd be better concentrating on filling up the enormous blanks in our "education." Here is just one quotation from the essay about Yuli Martov which has appeared in the book *Russia at the Turn of the Century*.

Martov, one of the founders and leaders of Russian Social Democracy, an ideologist of Menshevism, wrote to N. Kristi, a friend of his, the following in December 1917 (the letter was previously published only in the collection of documents entitled *Martov and His Environment*, New York, 1959): "This is not only a matter of my profound conviction, that trying to implant socialism in an economically and culturally backward country is senselessly utopian; I am intrinsically incapable of putting up with the Arakcheyevian interpretation of socialism and the Pugachevian interpretation of class struggle, which come, of course, from the very fact that an attempt is being made to implant a European ideal on Asian soil... To me, socialism has always been not the negation of individual freedom and of the individual but, on the contrary, their supreme manifestation. And since reality is always stronger than any ideology, the "rule of the proletariat" is a mask for the clandestine growth of the worst kind of philistinism with all its specifically Russian vices such as lack of culture, cynical careerism, graft, parasitism, loose morals, irresponsibility, etc., and I shudder at the thought that the very idea will be discredited in the eyes of the people for a long time, that we are undoubtedly going through anarchy to a form of caesarism."

As we learn more about our history, much of it comes as a heavy shock. However shocking knowledge may be, though, it is always better than ignorance.

An anniversary of repressive psychiatry

The Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry: still no regrets

From the late 1960s up to 1989 the All-Union Serbsky Institute of General and Forensic Psychiatry was notorious for its cooperation with the KGB in suppressing well-known dissidents, such as Leonid Plyushch, Vladimir Bukovsky, Yessenin-Volpin, General Grigorenko and others. To help the KGB irradicate dissent, Serbsky experts diagnosed dissidents as mentally disturbed or irresponsible, thus making it possible for the KGB to lock them up in specialized mental hospitals for forced treatment. Some of the experts who worked under the KGB orders might have been quite sincere. From their point of view, a mentally sound Soviet citizen would not have fought against the most progressive and stable regime. The Serbsky Institute's efforts in fighting dissent did not go unrewarded: the institute was awarded the Order of The Red Banner of Labour and its workers received a wage hike.

Soviet psychiatrists were expelled from the World Psychiatric Association and stayed out of it until 1989. The condition for re-admission was changes in the institute's leadership and rehabilitation of its victims. However, this condition was kept secret for about a year. When it was finally published, the demand for the change of leadership was deliberately translated in such a vague manner that its meaning was almost totally obscured.

Nonetheless, Academician Georgy Morozov who headed the Serbsky for thirty years, finally had to step down and satisfy himself with the position of Honorary director of the Institute and General Pyotr Grigorenko has so far been the only rehabilitated victim, but even in his

case the rehabilitation was not complete (see NT 44/91). The people who falsified his medical history have gone unpunished. Academician Morozov who had deliberately misdiagnosed the general, has not been asked to answer for that either.

Now the Serbsky is 70 years old.

The anniversary was a unique opportunity for repentance. At first, it seemed that this opportunity would not be missed when the young director of the Serbsky, Tatyana Dmitriyeva made her outspoken address. After her, however, the spe-

aker's platform was occupied by Morozov who was greeted by applause. His long report listed the institute's contributions to the development of Soviet psychiatry and it was only once that Morozov made a brief reference to "the hard times in the institute's history which call for a more objective assessment."

As a special achievement, Morozov quoted the 75 doctoral degrees conferred on the Serbsky experts, although he forgot to mention that the doctorate theses defended at the institute did not satisfy the standard requirements and served to justify only those research findings that the institute leadership wanted to see justified.

The flow of official congratulations was so strong that, as one professor grimly joked, the Gulag itself seemed to be about to send its love to the institute. Traditionally, KGB workers have made up a much greater share of the staff at the Serbsky than at any other health care establishment.

Foreign colleagues boycotted the anniversary, first and foremost because of the figure of Academician Morozov. The only exception was the Cuban delegation.


Two well-known American psychiatrists, Melvin Sabshin, Medical Director of the American Psychiatric Association and Lorene Roth, a leading expert in the legal aspects of psychiatry (he participated in the 1989 and 1991 international fact-finding missions to the USSR) have recently refused to participate in a symposium held by the Serbsky Institute because Academician Morozov was also going to attend it.

The bureaucratic spirit is the main problem at the Serbsky. It can hardly be irradicated as long as old cadres notorious for persecution of dissidents continue to occupy leading positions at the institute.

The anniversary provided the Serbsky with an opportunity to make one more attempt to preserve itself as an artificial conglomeration of various clinics, research centres and sections united on a purely bureaucratic principle.

Last June inspectors of the World Psychiatric Association issued a report devoted to the Soviet psychiatrists' observance of the commitments undertaken two years before. When it studied the findings, the American Psychiatric Association called for the revision of the Soviet membership in the World Psychiatric Association...

Yuri Savenko,
President of the
Independent Psychiatric
Association



Drawing by Victor Bogorad



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